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Abstract
This paper studies how the possibility of voters calling for a referendum affects the
decision-making of elected representatives. In the absence of direct democracy, elected
officials who do not share the preferences of the majority of the electorate may enact
their preferred policies even at the cost of decreasing the likelihood of reelection. The
introduction of direct democracy diminishes the policy benefits of doing that, as voters
may now overturn some of the policy decisions. I show that, as a consequence, elected
officials are induced to implement the policies preferred by the voters not only on the
issue dimensions that are subject to a possible popular referendum, but also on those
that are not. This result holds even when the voters’ information about their true
interests is limited. The true impact of popular referenda on decision-making may
thus be much greater and much more pervasive than has previously been recognized
in theoretical and empirical research. Moreover, the lack of expertise of the electorate
may be a less severe problem than critics of the referendum argue. Further, the intro-
duction of direct democracy changes the value of information to the voters: whereas in
a strictly representative democracy, there are negative spillover effects of information
in the sense that being more likely to become informed about some policy dimensions
may undermine voters ability to control public officials on other dimensions, the possi-
bility of popular referenda means that additional information improves voter control,
including on issues that may be outside the direct democracy domain. JEL Codes:
D72.
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1 Introduction
By and large, modern democracies are representative democracies, in the sense that citizens
delegate, via elections, political decision-making powers to a small group of public officials.
In some democracies, however, citizens retain the power to settle certain policy decisions
directly, by holding referenda.1 Such referenda may be constitutionally mandated, initiated
by the government, or initiated by the citizens themselves.2 This paper studies how the
possibility of citizen-initiated referenda affects the ability of voters to hold elected officials
accountable.
The premise behind representative democracy is that elected representatives, given their
higher level of expertise and information, will be better able than the people to determine
which course of action furthers the public good.3 The essential purpose of elections is to
ensure that elected representatives indeed use their higher level of expertise and information
to advance the public good, and not their own private interests. Formal models of electoral
accountability suggest, however, that the electoral mechanism might fail to induce incum-
bents to act in accordance with voters’ interests.4 First, elections may not provide sufficient
incentives for elected officials to behave as faithful agents of the electorate if there is a suffi-
ciently large divergence in preference between voters and representatives. Incumbents might
then choose to implement policies that hurt the voters even at the cost of foregoing reelec-
1I use the term ‘referendum’ to designate a direct vote of the general electorate on a single political
question. For a similar definition, see Butler and Ranney (1994).
2For an overview of direct democracy institutions around the world see Butler and Ranney (1994); Uleri
and Gallagher (1996).
3Consider the following quote by Madison from the Federalist number 10: The effect of delegation is “to
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose.”
4See Ashworth (2012) for a review of the literature on electoral accountability.
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tion (see Ferejohn, 1986; Seabright, 1996; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997). Second, in a
purely representative democracy, elected officials may choose to implement policies that are
popular with the electorate, yet not in the public interest, in order to increase their chances
of reelection (see Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts, 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Besley,
2006). In the first case, the electoral mechanism fails because elected officials do not value
reelection enough; in the second, because they value reelection too much.
Proponents of direct democracy then argue that the popular referendum, by giving vot-
ers the power to overrule certain decisions of their representatives, may serve as a corrective
when elected representatives fail to take the preferences of the electorate into account and
may thereby improve the congruence between citizen preferences and enacted policies with
respect to those policy dimensions about which a referendum may be held. Recent theoreti-
cal models give credence to this idea and argue that citizen-initiated referenda may improve
congruence on those policy dimensions which may be subjected to a popular vote not only
through the direct approval of certain measures by the voters but also indirectly: legislators
may change their policy choices ex ante to avoid being overturned by a referendum (Gerber,
1996; Besley and Coate, 2008; Hug, 2004).
A common feature of these models is the assumption that the electorate is fully in-
formed about which policies correspond to the public interest. This literature thus does not
address the main criticism formulated against direct democracy, namely, that citizens lack
the expertise to make wise decisions. This lack of expertise might result in policy decisions
that, although popular, are not in the public interest, be it because voters enact such policies
in a direct vote (Gerber and Lupia, 1995), or because elected officials follow public opinion
in fear of being overturned in a popular referendum (Matsusaka, 2005).
Moreover, the formal theory literature has so far only considered the implications of
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citizens’ initiatives on policies that may be subjected to a popular vote and disregarded the
possibility of broader implications of direct democracy on representative government. An
important, informal, argument against direct democracy, however, is that it weakens the
authority of elected officials and representatives and therefore undermines the process of
representative government (Butler and Ranney, 1994; Mueller, 1996; Broder, 2000).
Using a formal model of electoral accountability, I show, however, that giving voters
the power to call for a referendum on certain policy issues not only improves congruence
between enacted policies and the true preferences of the citizens on those policy dimensions
which can be subjected to a referendum, but, surprisingly, also on those which, perhaps for
constitutional reasons, can not. Moreover, I show that this holds true, even when voters are
potentially misinformed about their true interests. These results have broad implications
for the analysis of the effects of direct democracy on the decision-making of elected repre-
sentatives. Indeed, the true impact of popular referenda on decision-making may be much
greater and much more pervasive than has previously been recognized. Empirical research,
in particular, by focussing solely on those dimensions which can be subjected to a referendum
(cf. Matsusaka, 1995, 2004; Gerber, 1999; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Feld and Matsusaka,
2003), may have systematically underestimated the true effect of direct democracy. More-
over, the lack of expertise of the electorate may be a less severe problem than critics of the
referendum argue.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Consider an elected official who has
to make multiple policy decisions in a given term. Suppose the official both cares about
the policies he implements and about retaining office at the end of his term. Moreover, the
official may share the preferences of the majority of the electorate, (that is, be congruent)
or he may have policy preferences that differ from those (be non-congruent), while the
electorate is uncertain as to the policy preferences of the elected representative. Going
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forward the electorate would like to retain congruent representatives over non-congruent
ones, and thus congruent incumbents have incentive to signal their policy preferences to the
electorate, while non-congruent ones might want to conceal them to increase their chances
of reelection. In such a situation non-congruent incumbents essentially face the following
trade-off. On the one hand, they may choose the same policies as congruent incumbents
thereby concealing their policy preferences and improving their chances of re-election. This,
however, comes at the cost of choosing policies the non-congruent incumbent dislikes. On the
other hand, non-congruent officials may choose their preferred policies. This, in turn, comes
at the risk of revealing to the electorate their ideology and losing re-election. Which option
non-congruent incumbents will choose, ultimately depends on the value of holding office
relative to the policy costs non-congruent incumbents need to incur to mimic the behavior of
congruent incumbents and get reelected. The key insight of my analysis is that these policy
costs vary with the institutional setting and the information available to the electorate.5 In
particular, giving the voters the power to call for a referendum reduces these costs and thus
increases the incentive for non-congruent incumbents to seek re-election by adopting policies
also chosen by congruent incumbents.
To make this logic fully apparent, consider the extreme case in which voters are fully
informed about which policy choice is in their best interest on all policy dimensions and
are given the power to hold a referendum on some policy dimensions. In the absence of
the popular referendum, the non-congruent incumbent will need to go against his policy
preferences on all policy dimensions in order to appear congruent and gain re-election. The
5In this, my argument is related to Fox and Stephenson (2013) who argue that pro-minority judicial
review reduces the costs to the pro-minority leader of mimicking the pro-majority leader’s behavior, as the
pro-minority judiciary will bail out pro-minority leaders from the consequences of pro-majoritarian policy
choices. In my model, popular referenda clearly do not bail out non-congruent incumbents. Moreover, Fox
and Stephenson (2013) consider a single-dimensional policy space in which voters are fully informed about
the policies that are in the public interest and therefore do not generate predictions about spill-over effects
of popular referenda and information across policy issues as I do here.
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policy costs that non-congruent incumbents must shoulder in order to be re-elected are
thus likely to be quite substantial and may outweigh the benefits of holding office. When
voters retain the right to amend policy decisions on some policy dimensions via a popular
vote, elected officials lose the final say over these policy issues. Whether the non-congruent
incumbent chooses his preferred policy or the policy preferred by the electorate does not
matter policy wise, as voters will simply overturn, if needed, the policy decision of the elected
representative. Hence, to secure re-election the non-congruent incumbent will only need to
incur the policy costs of going against his preferences on those policy dimensions which cannot
be subjected to a referendum. As a result the benefits of holding office may now be sufficiently
high for the non-congruent incumbent to be willing to make this policy sacrifice. Thus,
the introduction of the popular referendum strengthens the incentives for non-congruent
incumbents to seek re-election by behaving as if congruent instead of implementing their
preferred, and possibly unpopular, policies and thus potentially foregoing reelection. Of
course, to avoid being distinguished from a congruent incumbent, a non-congruent one will
need to mimic the congruent behavior across the full range of policy choices, including on
policy dimensions that are not subject to popular referenda.
When the voters’ information about optimal policy choices is limited, this stronger
office-holding motive may in principle lead the incumbents to pander more often, as critics
of the referendum argue. I show, however, that if the electorate is well informed about
some of the policy issues, the popular referendum improves the congruence between enacted
policies and the true preferences of the voters on all policy dimensions, even when the voters
are very unlikely—even certain not to—acquire information about the optimal policies on
other dimensions, in particular those on which they can call for a referendum. Indeed, upon
observing that the incumbent behaved poorly on some policy dimension, the voters update
unfavorably on the type of the incumbent and on the likelihood that the policy decision
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on other dimensions corresponds to the voters’ best interest. Despite not knowing which
policy is actually optimal, voters may then decide to hold a referendum, thereby effectively
constraining the policy benefits that a non-congruent incumbent can receive when choosing
his preferred policies and inducing him to seek reelection instead.
The incentives of non-congruent incumbents to seek re-election over choosing their pre-
ferred policies also depend in non-trivial, and surprising, ways on the likelihood that voters
become informed as to whether implemented policy choices are in their best interest. In the
absence of the popular referendum, I show that being more likely to observe the consequences
of the elected official’s actions with respect to some policy issue A may diminish the ability
of voters to hold elected officials accountable on some other policy issue B without improving
accountability on policy issue A. In other words, there are negative spillover effects of infor-
mation for voters. Indeed, when voters are fully informed, non-congruent incumbents need
to go against their policy preferences on all policy dimensions and may thus prefer to forego
re-election by choosing their preferred policies. On the contrary, when voters are likely to be
well informed about some of the policy issues and likely to be poorly informed about others,
non-congruent incumbents may conceal their true preferences by mimicking congruent be-
havior on those dimensions where the electorate is well informed and by choosing popular,
yet not optimal for voters, policies on those dimensions about which the voters are less well
informed. In that, the non-congruent incumbents may need to give up only some—rather
than all—of the policies they prefer in order to get reelected. Interestingly, the introduction
of the referendum significantly changes how electoral accountability relates to the probability
that voters become informed. In particular, I show that when the benefits of holding office
are relatively limited, the ability of the electorate to improve congruence on policy dimen-
sions which cannot be subjected to the popular referendum depends non-monotonically on
the likelihood that voters learn whether the policy choice was correct on those dimensions
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which can. Moreover, when the benefits of holding office are sufficiently high, the negative
spillover effects of information disappear when the possibility of popular referenda is intro-
duced. That is, the ability of the electorate to hold elected officials accountable increases
on all policy dimensions as voters become more likely to learn whether implemented policies
are in the public interest or not.
The model also generates a rich set of empirical predictions and suggests the need for
a shift in the focus of empirical research. First, empirical analyses of the effects of citizen
initiatives on decision-making, by solely focusing on policy dimensions subjected to referenda,
may have systematically underestimated the influence of direct democracy. Further empirical
research on the effects of direct democracy should look beyond those policy fields which can
be subjected to a referendum. Second, as non-congruent incumbents are more likely to
adopt the behavior of congruent incumbents, states with the possibility of popular referenda
should have less politician turnover. Third, in the model, the voters are more likely to hold
a referendum when they believe it to be more likely that the incumbent is non-congruent.
Hence, incumbents whose policy choice is overturned in a referendum should be less likely
to be reelected at the end of their term. Fourth, referenda should be more likely when
policy outcomes, on dimensions on which no referendum may be held, are bad. And fifth,
referenda should only occur on policy fields where politicians are uncertain about the policy
preferences of the electorate.
My paper is related to a number of literatures. First, a series of papers compares
the respective benefits of representative democracy versus direct democracy (Persson and
Tabellini, 1994; Redoano and Scharf, 2004; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Binswanger and Pru¨fer,
2012). Instead, the focus here is on how institutions of direct democracy alter the decision-
making process in a representative democracy. As noted by Hug (2009), only few papers
study this question. Gerber (1996), Matsusaka and McCarty (2001), and Hug (2004) amend
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the agenda setter model (see Romer and Rosenthal, 1978, 1979) by allowing other actors to
decide whether a referendum should be held or not. An important feature of these models is
that politicians do not have reelection concerns and only care about the policies implemented.
In contrast, it is precisely the trade-off between policy preferences and office-motivation that
lies behind the results in my model. Besley and Coate (2008) study a citizen-candidate
model with a two-dimensional policy space and show that citizen initiatives may improve
congruence on those policy dimensions which can be subjected to a referendum.6 Finally,
Prato and Strulovici (2013) (see also Kessler, 2005) offer an interesting counterpoint and
argue that citizen initiatives reduce the incentive for politicians to search for good policies
and thereby may negatively affect voters’ welfare. They consider a setting where politicians
do not know ex ante which policy is in the voters’ best interests, whereas voters, as in all
papers previously cited, do. In contrast, I study the case where politicians are ex ante better
informed than the electorate. Moreover, none of these papers consider the effects of the
popular referendum on policy dimensions which cannot be subjected to a referendum.
My model is also related to the literature on multi-task issues in political agency settings
(see Ashworth, 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Gehlbach, 2006; Hatfield and
Padro i Miquel, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2013;
Bueno de Mesquita and Landa, 2013b,a; Morelli and Van Weelden, 2013). These papers focus
on entirely different sets of issues, however. In particular, in none of these papers is it the case
that an institution which, by design, only affects one dimension of policy-making directly,
leads indirectly to changes in policy-making on other policy dimensions. One exception is
the paper by Daley and Snowberg (2011) who show that campaign finance reform can lead
politicians to signal their competence by expending more effort on improving the quality of
6In a related paper, Besley and Coate (2003) study a citizen-candidate model with two policy issues:
regulating a monopoly and public spending. They show that when a single elected official, who appoints a
regulator, is responsible for both policies, the implemented regulation can diverge from voters’ preferences.
Congruence can then be restored by having the citizens directly elect the regulator.
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policy rather than through campaign expenditure. The mechanism is very different from the
one in the present model in at least two ways. First, results in Daley and Snowberg (2011)
are driven by the assumption that it is cheaper for the incumbent to signal ability through
campaign expenditure than through improving policy.7 In my model, no such assumption
is needed for the identified spillover effect of popular referenda. Second, campaign finance
reform does not alter the ability of the electorate to distinguish good and bad types. In my
model, however, the introduction of the popular referendum leads non-congruent incumbents
to behave like congruent ones more often, thereby reducing the ability of the electorate to
select good types.
My analysis is also related to the literature on transparency and accountability. While
in classical moral hazard models of electoral agency (see Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1989; Seabright, 1996; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita,
2007), just as in contract theory (see Holmstro¨m, 1979; Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1991) ac-
countability is improved when the politician’s actions are observable by the electorate, two ar-
guments against transparency of actions have been developed in the literature. First, a series
of papers (see Prat, 2005; Fox, 2007; Ashworth and Shotts, 2010; Morelli and Van Weelden,
2013) has argued that when the electorate observes the incumbent’s actions and those ac-
tions are in themselves informative as to the incumbent’s type, incumbents may be lead to
act according to how the principal expects a ‘good’ incumbent to act a priori, instead of
choosing those actions which are in fact best for the electorate. Second, if an agent has to
perform several tasks sequentially in order to reach a certain outcome and if the principal is
unable to commit ex ante to a certain retention rule, the principal may end up using a reten-
7Consider the following summary of the mechanism provided by Daley and Snowberg (2011): ‘When
senders have multiple signaling channels at their disposal, and receivers cannot credibly commit to ignoring
any of these channels, senders will use the least costly signals to reveal their types—even if receivers would
prefer different signals were used. (...) Policies that restrict signaling channels that are less preferable to
receivers can ... improv(e) receiver welfare at the expense of senders.’ P. 342.
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tion rule that increases effort in the late stages of the policy-making process at the expense
of effort in earlier stages, thereby reducing allocative efficiency of effort across tasks (see
Bueno de Mesquita and Landa, 2013a). In all these models, however, it is always beneficial
for the electorate to obtain more precise measures of the consequences of the agent’s actions.
Similarly, Lohmann (1998), Ashworth (2005), and Alesina and Tabellini (2007) show that,
in career concerns models of electoral accountability, the incumbent exerts more effort as the
policy outcome observed by the electorate is less due to noise. In contrast, in a multi-task
signaling model with moral hazard and adverse selection, I show that being more likely to
observe the outcomes of implemented policies may reduce the ability of the electorate to hold
elected officials accountable. This stands in sharp contrast to results obtained in single-task
signaling models of electoral accountability with moral hazard and adverse selection, (see
Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts, 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Besley, 2006; Ashworth
and Shotts, 2010; Fox and Van Weelden, 2012), where the incumbent is more likely to choose
the policy that corresponds to the state of the world, the more likely the electorate is to
learn the consequences of the incumbent’s action.8 Moreover, I show that there are negative
spillover effects of information in that higher transparency of consequences on some policy
issues may reduce accountability on other policy issues, even when the issues under consider-
ation are not substitutes. This distinguishes my work from Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991)
who find that, when tasks are substitutes, a lower transparency of performance on one task
may decrease effort provision by the agent on this task, as well as on other tasks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, I study
this model in the case where the voters are not directly involved in policy-making. In the
subsequent section, I characterize the equilibria when the voters are given the power to
call for a referendum on certain policy dimensions. Comparing the equilibria of the model
8Note that Fox and Van Weelden (2012) show that this increased congruence between implemented policy
and state of the world may decrease the expected welfare of the principal when costs are asymmetric.
11
presented in sections 3 and 4, I assess the impact of the popular referendum on representative
democracy in section 5. In section 6, I show that the results are robust to a specification of
the model which allows for incumbents to be congruent on some policy issues but not others.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a representative democracy consisting of a representative Voter (V) and an Incum-
bent (I). There are two periods, in which three policies, p1, p2, p3 ∈ {−1, 1}, are enacted.
Policies p1 and p2 are implemented in the first period, whereas policy p3 is implemented in
the second period. For each of these policy issues, the optimal action—the action that is
in the public interest—depends on the state of the world, ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ {−1, 1}, that may
be unknown to the Voter.9 With respect to every policy, the Voter receives a payoff of 1
if the optimal action is implemented and 0 otherwise. The prior probability that pi = 1 is
the optimal action is α ∈ (1
2
, 1
]
, so that in the absence of additional information about the
state of the world, the Voter would want pi = 1 to be enacted for all the policy issues in
the model.10 Unlike the Voter, the Incumbent is fully informed about the respective states
of the world and thus knows which policies are best for him (and which policies are best for
the Voter). Although the Voter does not know the states of the world ω1 and ω2 ex ante, she
learns with certainty the state of the world on dimension p2 whereas the state of the world
ω1 is revealed to her with probability q1 ∈ [0, 1]. Henceforth, I refer to q1 as the probability
of feedback. The parameter q1 can be conceived as the speed with which the consequences of
the policies become apparent to the Voter. Alternatively, the probability q1 can be thought
9The assumptions about the information available to the Voter will be detailed below.
10To simplify notation, I assume the same prior belief for all states of the world, i.e., Pr(ωi = 1) =
α ∈ ( 12 , 1] for all i = 1, 2, 3. Considering different values of α for each policy would not change how the
introduction of the popular referendum affects decision-making.
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of as a measure of the technicality of the policy issue in question.
An additional tension in the model arises from the fact that the Voter is uncertain
about the preferences of the Incumbent. With probability pi > 1/2 the Incumbent has the
same preference ranking as the Voter would have if she was fully informed, in which case
he is congruent. With probability 1− pi the policy preferences of the Incumbent differ from
those of the Voter, in which case he is non-congruent.11
In the first period, the Incumbent chooses two policies, p1 and p2. Upon observing the
policy choices p1 and p2, and potentially their respective optimality, the Voter can choose
to hold a referendum over policy p1 at a cost κ > 0.
12 The assumption that the Voter can-
not hold a referendum about policy p2 excludes certain policy fields from the direct control
of the Voter. This mirrors constitutional provisions in many countries. Article 75 of the
Italian constitution for example specifies that a popular referendum can be requested by
five hundred thousand voters. No referendum, however, ‘may be held on a law regulating
taxes, the budget, amnesty or pardon, or a law ratifying an international treaty.’ Similar
restrictions can be found, for example, in Austria (at the regional level), Brazil, Colombia,
Germany (at the regional level), Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Serbia, Uruguay, etc. In the
United States, among the 24 states that permit citizens’ initiatives, 12 have subject restric-
tions. For example, in Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wyoming initiatives may not
make appropriations or dedicate revenues. In Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, and Nevada
appropriations require a funding source. Note further that in all the states, statutes are
11One might consider the possibility that the Incumbent is congruent with respect to one of the two first
period policies but not the other. As I show in section 6, introducing such semi-congruent types does not
alter the fundamental incentive structure of the game and would thus not alter the substance of the results.
Excluding semi-congruent types permits a much cleaner presentation and allows us to focus on the main
trade-offs captured by the model.
12Note that the Voter can hold a referendum over the policy over which she might not be well informed. In
the appendix I show that the results are robust to an alternate specification where the Voter learns ω1 with
certainty and ω2 with probability q2 ∈ [0, 1]. I focus on the case where q1 ∈ [0, 1], as the lack of expertise of
the electorate is often presented as one of the main problems of direct democracy.
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subject to judicial review which de facto creates certain restrictions on the legislation which
can be passed through a referendum. Of course, there also exists jurisdictions where no
restrictions apply, most notably the paragon of direct democracy Switzerland.13
After her decision to hold a referendum, the Voter chooses whether to reelect the In-
cumbent or not. I use the following notation to denote the probability with which the Voter
reelects the Incumbent based on her observations. Let r(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) be the probability
that the Voter reelects the incumbent upon observing p1 = 1 and p2 = ω2. This corresponds
to the case where the Voter observes ω2 and the Incumbent matched the policy p2 to the
state of the world, yet the Voter does not observe the state of the world ω1 and thus only
observes that the Incumbent set p1 = 1. r(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and so forth are interpreted in
the same way.
In the second period, the Incumbent, or the newly elected challenger, selects a third
policy, p3, and then the game ends. The challenger is also congruent with probability pi and
non-congruent with probability 1− pi. In the background I therefore assume that there is a
mechanism that produces challengers such that the Voter always has a choice between the
Incumbent and a challenger and the probability that the challenger is congruent is positive.14
To summarize, the sequence of the model is as follows:
1. Period 1. Nature determines states of the world ω1, ω2 ∈ {−1, 1}
2. Nature determines the Incumbent’s type and the challenger’s type.
13There is a further methodological reason for assuming that the Voter cannot call for a referendum on
every policy dimension. Because some of the key aspects of the analysis presented below concern precisely
the spillover effects of direct democracy, it is desirable to have a model in which referenda are possible on
some but not all policy dimensions.
14Note that the second period is largely heuristic and makes sure that the Voter prefers to retain a
congruent Incumbent and to dismiss a non-congruent one. As such, giving the Incumbent the power to make
several policy decisions in the second period, as in the first, would not alter the results.
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3. The Incumbent observes ω1 and ω2 and chooses policies p1, p2 ∈ {−1, 1},
4. The Voter observes p1, p2, ω2, and, with probability q1 ∈ [0, 1], ω1 and decides whether
to hold a referendum over policy p1 at cost κ > 0.
5. After its decision to hold a referendum, the Voter chooses whether to reelect the In-
cumbent.
6. Period 2. Nature chooses ω3 ∈ {−1, 1}.
7. The second-period office-holder observes ω3 and chooses policy p3 ∈ {−1, 1}.
The Voter receives a policy payoff of 1 for each policy that matches the state of the
world (pi = ωi) and 0 otherwise. The utility of the Voter can be written compactly as
UV (p,ω) =
3∑
i=1
1{pi=ωi},
where p ≡ (p1, p2, p3), ω ≡ (ω1, ω2, ω3) and 1{pi=ωi} is an indicator function that takes on
value 1 whenever pi = ωi and 0 otherwise.
A congruent Incumbent shares the policy preferences of the Voter. For each policy
that does not match the state of the world (pi 6= ωi) the policy payoff to the non-congruent
Incumbent is 1, while it is 0 otherwise. However, the Incumbent does not care about policy
when not in office. Thus, as in Maskin and Tirole (2004), elected officials want to leave a
legacy and be remembered for their achievements.15 The Incumbent is also office-motivated
receiving an additional benefit of holding office B ∈ (0, 1)16 if retained at the end of period
15I get substantially similar results in a model in which Incumbents also care about policy while not in
office.
16In section 7, I consider the case where the value of holding office B is greater or equal to 1. I focus on
B < 1 at first, as this is the more problematic case in the baseline model for solving the principal-agent
problem. It is therefore particularly interesting to see that the introduction of the popular referendum
improves congruence even in this hardest case.
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1. The utility of a congruent Incumbent from implementing policy vector p when the vector
of states of the world is ω can thus be written as
UC(p,ω, r) =
2∑
i=1
1{pi=ωi}+q1r(p1, p2;ω1, ω2)(B+1{p3=ω3})+(1−q1)r(p1, p2;ω2)(B+1{p3=ω3}),
while the utility of a non-congruent Incumbent is given by
UN(p,ω, r) =
2∑
i=1
1{pi 6=ωi}+q1r(p1, p2;ω1, ω2)(B+1{p3 6=ω3})+(1−q1)r(p1, p2;ω2)(B+1{p3 6=ω3}).
The solution concept I use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Informally, a PBE requires
(1) that every player of the game chooses the strategy which maximizes her expected utility
given her beliefs and the strategies of the remaining players and (2) that beliefs are computed
using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Throughout, I assume that congruent types choose
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for all (ω1, ω2) and solve for the non-congruent type’s and the Voter’s
equilibrium strategies and beliefs. Equilibria with this specification of congruent types’
behavior always exist.17
2.1 Preliminary Analysis
As the game ends with the second period, the election winner simply implements his preferred
policy in the second period, i.e. the congruent Incumbent matches the second-period policy
to the state of the world (p3 = ω3), while the non-congruent one does not (p3 6= ω3). It follows
17 In the baseline model, an equilibrium survives a straightforward adaptation of criterion D1 (Cho and
Kreps, 1987) if, and only if, congruent types choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for all (ω1, ω2). In the model with
referendum, an equilibrium survives D1 if, and only if, congruent types choose p2 = ω2. In the model with
referendum there may be equilibria that survive D1 in which congruent types choose p1 6= ω1. Such equilibria
have the perverse, and empirically implausible, feature that congruent types strive to reveal to the Voter
that they are congruent by choosing a non-congruent policy.
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that the Voter prefers to retain a congruent Incumbent and to dismiss a non-congruent one.
I next study when the Voter is going to decide to hold a referendum. Obviously, if the Voter
observes that the policy p1 does not match the state of the world, the payoff he receives when
he chooses to hold a referendum to fix the ill-advised policy of the Incumbent is 1−κ, while
refraining from using direct democracy yields a payoff of 0. It follows that the Voter calls for
a referendum whenever p1 6= ω1 and the cost of holding a referendum is not too high (κ ≤ 1).
If the Voter does not observe whether the policy p1 matches the state of the world or not, his
payoff from holding a referendum to change the policy is given by Pr(ω1 6= p1|p1, p2;ω2)−κ,
where Pr(ω1 6= p1|p1, p2;ω2) is the belief of the Voter that ω1 6= p1 given that the Voter
observes p1, p2 and ω2. If the Voter does not call for a referendum to change the policy he
receives a payoff of Pr(ω1 = p1|p1, p2;ω2). It follows that the Voter only holds a referendum
upon not observing ω1, when Pr(ω1 6= p1|p1, p2;ω2) − κ ≥ Pr(ω1 = p1|p1, p2;ω2). Clearly,
the Voter never holds a referendum if the cost of holding a referendum is too high (κ > 1).
As a result the model presented above corresponds to two possible types of representa-
tive democracy: a fully representative democracy in which direct democracy at the initiative
of the Voter is not an option and a representative democracy which includes democratic ele-
ments at the leisure of the Voter. To study how the introduction of the popular referendum
alters the functioning of the fully representative democracy, I first describe the equilibria of
the representative democracy game (κ > 1). In the subsequent section, I then study the
equilibria of the game, when the Voter can decide to call for a referendum (κ ≤ 1).
3 Baseline Model
In this section I present the equilibrium of the game when the Voter cannot call for a
referendum and discuss some of its implications. I illustrate the equilibrium behavior of
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the non-congruent Incumbent in Figure 1. The value of holding office B is plotted on the
horizontal axis, while the probability of feedback q1 is on the vertical axis. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the equilibrium then depends on the probability of feedback q1 and the value of
holding office B.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium:
1. if the probability of feedback is high (q1 ≥ BB+1), non-congruent incumbents choose their
preferred first-period policies (p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2),
2. if the probability of feedback is low (q1 <
B
B+1
), non-congruent Incumbents choose the
Voter’s preferred policy on the second dimension (p2 = ω2) with non-degenerate proba-
bility. On the first dimension, however, they choose the policy preferred by themselves
(p1 6= ω1) with certainty.18
18A complete statement of equilibrium strategies and beliefs for this and other games analyzed below can
be found in the appendix.
18
Figure 1: Equilibrium Behavior of non-congruent Incumbent in Baseline Model, B < 1
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Note that as the Voter observes ω2, non-congruent Incumbents always separate from
congruent ones when the probability of feedback q1 is high and partially separate when it is
low.
The intuition for this result is simple. For any (q1, B) pair, the non-congruent Incumbent
must decide whether he wants to masquerade as a congruent Incumbent or not. Obviously,
mimicking the behavior of congruent Incumbents presents an upside and a downside. On
the upside, it potentially improves the chances of reelection of the non-congruent Incumbent.
On the downside, it requires the non-congruent Incumbent to choose first-period policies he
dislikes. The first important step of our analysis is then to recognize that, as the value of
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holding office is limited (B < 1), non-congruent Incumbents are never willing to behave in
the public interest with respect to both first-period policy issues. If they were to do so,
they would at most receive a payoff of B+ 1, while implementing their preferred first-period
policies yields a payoff of 2.
This does not imply, however, that non-congruent Incumbents always disregard the
preferences of the public in the first period. Indeed, suppose the non-congruent Incumbent
were to choose (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) with positive probability. If the Voter does not observe
the state of the world ω1, i.e. if the Voter only observes whether policy p1 is equal to 1 or to
−1, the Voter will be uncertain as to the type of the Incumbent. For example, if the Voter
observes (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) she might either be facing a congruent Incumbent who observes
that ω1 = −1 or a non-congruent Incumbent who observes that ω1 = 1. If the non-congruent
Incumbent chooses (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) with sufficiently low probability, the Voter will then be
compelled to reelect the Incumbent whenever she does not observe whether the implemented
policy p1 is in the public’s interest. When choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2), the non-congruent
Incumbent thus incurs a policy cost of 1 in the first period, as he is giving up policy p2, but
may obtain a gain of B+ 1 whenever he gets reelected. If the non-congruent Incumbent gets
reelected sufficiently often when choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) he will thus choose this policy
vector over implementing his preferred first-period policies.
The probability of being reelected upon choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) depends on the
probability of feedback q1, however. Indeed, if uncertainty about ω1 resolves, the Voter will
infer from p1 6= ω1 that she is facing a non-congruent Incumbent and will vote the non-
congruent Incumbent out of office. Hence, as q1 increases, the probability with which the
non-congruent Incumbent gets reelected upon choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) decreases. If the
probability of feedback is sufficiently high, i.e. q1 ≥ BB+1 , the non-congruent Incumbent is
likely to get caught when choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) and he thus opts to separate from
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congruent types by choosing (p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2). When q1 is sufficiently low, the non-
congruent Incumbent will have incentives to choose (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) at least part of the
time.
4 Introducing Direct Democracy
I now consider the case where the Voter is given the opportunity to call for a referendum
on policy p1. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibria of the game in this parameter range. Here,
the equilibrium depends on the probability of feedback q1 and the value of holding office
B. In particular, there are three regions which are referred to as q1 high, q1 low, and q1
intermediate. These regions give rise to different equilibrium strategy profiles:
Proposition 2. In equilibrium:
1. if the probability of feedback is high (q1 ≥ max{1 − 2B, 1B+2}), non-congruent Incum-
bents implement the Voter’s preferred policies with respect to all policy dimensions:
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2),
2. if the probability of feedback is low (q1 < min{ 2BB+1 , 1B+2}), non-congruent Incumbents
choose p1 = ω1 with non-degenerate probability and p2 = ω2 with certainty,
3. if the probability of feedback takes on intermediate values (q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B]), non-
congruent Incumbents choose p1 = ω1 and p2 = ω2 with non-degenerate probability.
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19Note that q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1 , 1− 2B
]
implies that B < B, where B denotes the value of B which solves
2B
B+1 = 1− 2B.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Behavior of non-congruent Incumbent in Direct Democracy Model
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When the probability of feedback q1 is high, the non-congruent Incumbent has almost
no control over p1 as the Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1 whenever p1 6= ω1 is revealed
to her. Thus, choosing p1 6= ω1 yields almost no policy gains over choosing p1 = ω1 but is
likely to cost the Incumbent reelection, as the Voter learns her true type whenever p1 6= ω1
is revealed to her. Therefore, the non-congruent Incumbent essentially has only to give up
one policy, namely p2, to win reelection, which incentivizes him to choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2).
To understand what happens when q1 takes on lower values, notice first that the payoff
to a non-congruent Incumbent of choosing p2 6= ω2 depends on the decision of the Voter to
hold a referendum when she observes p2 6= ω2. Suppose for example that the Voter always
chooses to set p1 = 1 when she observes p2 6= ω2 and uncertainty is not resolved about ω1.
Then, the payoff to the non-congruent Incumbent of choosing p2 6= ω2 is 1 whenever he
observes ω1 = 1 but 2− q1 whenever ω1 = −1 is revealed to him.
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Consider now what happens if the non-congruent Incumbent chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
upon observing ω1 = −1 and the Voter does not observe ω1. In this case, as p1 = 1 is the ex
ante popular policy and Incumbents are ex ante more likely to be congruent (pi > 1/2), the
Voter chooses not to hold a referendum. Hence, when the probability of feedback q1 is low,
the non-congruent Incumbent can essentially get his preferred outcome with respect to policy
dimension p1 when he observes that the state of the world is ω1 = −1. Moreover, the Voter
believes the Incumbent to be more likely to be congruent than a potential challenger and
thus reelects. Hence, if q1 is low, the non-congruent Incumbent only needs to give up policy
p2 in order to get reelected when ω1 = −1. This implies that for low values of q1, the non-
congruent Incumbent is better off choosing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) when ω1 = −1 independently
of the decision of the Voter to hold a referendum or not upon observing p2 6= ω2. If the
Voter then chooses to enforce p1 = 1 whenever she observes p2 6= ω2 and ω1 is not revealed
to her, the non-congruent Incumbent only receives a payoff of 1 when choosing p2 6= ω2
upon observing ω1 = 1. But then, the non-congruent Incumbent prefers to masquerade as a
congruent type by choosing p2 = ω2 whenever ω1 = 1.
What happens if the probability of feedback q1 takes on intermediate values? In such an
instance, it might be that the non-congruent Incumbent does not get caught often enough
to consider p1 as a foregone policy, yet too often to consider p1 as a policy over which
the Incumbent has almost full control upon observing ω1 = −1. In such a case, the non-
congruent Incumbent, upon observing ω1 = −1, essentially needs to give up policy p2 but
also to some extent policy p1 in order to get reelected. If the benefit of holding office is
sufficiently high, the non-congruent Incumbent is willing to do so. When the benefit is too
low, however, he might be tempted to choose p2 6= ω2 with positive probability, unless the
Voter holds a referendum with sufficiently high probability to set p1 = −1 upon observing
p2 6= ω2. Note however that when q1 is low, the equilibrium is sustained by the decision of
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the Voter to hold a referendum to set p1 = 1 whenever needed, upon observing p2 6= ω2. If
the Voter now holds a referendum to set p1 = −1 with positive probability, when observing
p2 6= ω2, the incentives for the non-congruent type of choosing p2 6= ω2 upon observing ω1 = 1
increase. Hence, to sustain an equilibrium in which the non-congruent Incumbent always
chooses p2 = ω2, the probability with which the Voter sets p1 = −1 upon observing p2 6= ω2
has to be neither too high nor too low. As it turns out, when the benefit of holding office is
sufficiently low, there exists a range of values for q1 in which it is not possible for the Voter
to set p1 = −1 upon observing p2 6= ω2 with a probability sufficiently high and sufficiently
low to deter the non-congruent Incumbent from choosing p2 6= ω2 upon observing ω1 = −1
and upon observing ω1 = 1 respectively. For this range of parameter values, there exits an
infinity of equilibria. For any of these equilibria, non-congruent types will choose p2 6= ω2
and p1 = ω1 with positive probability both upon observing ω1 = 1 and ω1 = −1.
5 The Impact of the Popular Referendum
5.1 Improved Congruence
Comparison of the equilibria in Proposition 1 to the equilibria in Proposition 2 illustrates the
effects of the popular referendum on representative democracy when B < 1. An observation
worth repeating is that congruent Incumbents behave optimally from the point of view of
the Voter with regard to every single policy of the game, whether the Voter is given the
ability to call for a referendum on policy p1 or not. It is the behavior of non-congruent
Incumbents which is affected by the popular referendum. Let us first consider the impact of
the popular referendum on policy p1, the policy about which the Voter is given the power
of direct control. In the baseline model, non-congruent Incumbents always disregard the
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Voter’s preferences about policy p1, implementing p1 6= ω1 independently of the probability
of feedback q1. In the model with direct democracy, non-congruent types always choose
p1 = ω1 with positive probability for all values of q1.
A more surprising aspect of the analysis is that the popular referendum not only im-
proves the congruence with respect to policies on which a referendum may be placed, but also
with respect to policy issues that are outside the reach of direct democracy. In the baseline
model, non-congruent Incumbents never choose p2 = ω2 when q1 >
B
B+1
and choose p2 6= ω2
with non-degenerate probability when q1 ≤ BB+1 . The introduction of direct democracy
leads the non-congruent Incumbents to always choose p2 = ω2 when q1 ≤ BB+1 . Moreover,
when q1 >
B
B+1
there always exists equilibria in which p2 = ω2 is implemented with positive
probability by the non-congruent Incumbents.
Proposition 3. For any probability of feedback q1, giving the Voter the power to call for
a referendum on policy p1 improves the congruence between enacted policies and Voter’s
preferences with respect to p1 as well as with respect to p2, the policy about which the Voter
cannot hold a referendum.
Interestingly, this improved congruence between enacted policies and the preferences
of the Voter even occurs when the Voter is very unlikely to—even certain not to—observe
the state of the world on dimension 1 and thus is barely able to correct the errors of non-
congruent Incumbents. Even in the extreme case where the Voter is certain not to learn
whether the implemented policy is in the public interest, i.e. q1 = 0, the possibility that the
Voter may call for a referendum increases the probability that the implemented policies will
match the first-period policies to the respective states of the world.
It is instructive to compare these results to those found in models by Gerber (1996), Hug
(2004), and Besley and Coate (2008). There, the introduction of the popular referendum
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improves the congruence between enacted policies and voters’ preferences, but only on those
policy dimensions which can be subjected to direct democracy. Moreover, voters are always
assumed to be fully informed about their true preferences in these models. Proposition 3
above shows, however, that the Voter is getting higher congruence even when she is not
fully informed about her true interests. Proposition 3 also stands in contrast to Matsusaka
and McCarty (2001) who find, in a model with policy-driven politicians, that initiatives may
move the policy farther away from the voter’s ideal point. In the present paper, the reelection
concerns are precisely what motivates the Incumbent to alter his behavior and attend more
closely to the Voter’s preferences.
A related question is whether the introduction of direct democracy increases or decreases
pandering. At least two understandings of the concept of pandering can be found in the
literature. In the family of pandering models in which the Voter is uncertain about the
competence of elected officials (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts, 2001), pandering refers to
the situation in which an incumbent ‘implement(s) a policy that voters think is in their best
interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for
the voters’ (Ashworth and Shotts, 2010). When the Voter’s uncertainty is over the policy
preferences of the Incumbent (see Maskin and Tirole, 2004), pandering corresponds, however,
to the case in which an elected official chooses a popular policy in order to get reelected,
although this policy does not conform with the policy preferences of the official. When an
Incumbent is congruent, the two notions coincide, i.e. a congruent Incumbent panders if he
chooses the popular policy although he knows that this policy is not in the public’s interest.
In the case of non-congruent incumbents however, the two interpretations differ. Under the
first interpretation, one might consider that a non-congruent incumbent panders when he
chooses p1 = 1 although he observes ω1 = −1 for example. Under the second interpretation
however, pandering corresponds to the case, where in order to get reelected, a non-congruent
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Incumbent chooses pi = ωi, with i ∈ {1, 2}. If he chooses pi = ωi = 1, he simply panders to
the beliefs of the electorate, whereas when he chooses pi = ωi = −1 he essentially panders
to the beliefs about the optimal policy that the Voter is likely to have in the future. Maskin
and Tirole (2004) call this last behavior ‘forward-looking pandering’.
In this model, an equivalent interpretation of the fact that direct democracy improves
the congruence of implemented policies with the true interests of the electorate is thus that
direct democracy decreases pandering according to the interpretation of Canes-Wrone, Her-
ron and Shotts (2001) yet increases pandering according to Maskin and Tirole (2004). Note,
however, that as congruent Incumbents match the first-period policies to their respective
states of the world, under representative democracy as well as under direct democracy, the
introduction of the popular referendum does not lead congruent Incumbents to choose p1 = 1
when the state of the world is ω1 = −1 and this independently of the probability of feed-
back q1. In other words, the introduction of the popular referendum affects the pandering
behavior of non-congruent Incumbents but not of congruent ones.
A related aspect of the analysis is that the introduction of the referendum increases the
likelihood that the popular policies, namely p1 = 1 and p2 = 1, are implemented. In the
baseline model non-congruent Incumbents choose p1 = 1 only when the state of the world is
ω1 = −1. Hence, they implement p1 = 1 with probability 1 − α. Under direct democracy,
when q1 is high, non-congruent Incumbents choose p1 = 1 whenever ω1 = 1. The popular
policy is therefore enacted with probability α > 1 − α. When q1 is low, non-congruent
Incumbents choose p1 = 1 whenever ω1 = −1 but also with positive probability whenever
ω1 = 1. Similarly, in the baseline model, non-congruent Incumbents choose p2 = 1 with
probability 1−α when q1 is high (q1 ≥ BB+1). When q1 is low (q1 < BB+1) they choose p2 = 1
with probability 2(1 − α)α. Once direct democracy is introduced they choose p2 = 1 with
a probability superior to 1 − α when q1 ≥ BB+1 and with probability α > 2(1 − α)α when
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q1 <
B
B+1
. Therefore, the introduction of the referendum increases the congruence between
enacted policies and the voters’ ex ante beliefs about what is in their best interests.
The prediction that the popular policy p1 = 1 is implemented more often with the
introduction of a popular referendum is familiar and conforms to empirical results. Several
studies find for example that the implemented policies regarding the death penalty, abortion
and same sex marriage more closely reflect public opinion in states that permit voters to call
for a referendum (see Gerber, 1996, 1999; Hug, 2004; Matsusaka, 2010). In a recent book,
Matsusaka (2004) (see also Matsusaka, 1995) finds that the initiative process has lead over
the last thirty years to (1) lower public spending, (2) more decentralized spending decisions,
and (3) a lower reliance on taxes rather than user fees for services. He then finds that
these three policy changes brought about by the initiative reflect the will of the majority
of the population as expressed via opinion data. The prediction that the the introduction
of the popular referendum also increases the likelihood that the popular policy p2 = 1 is
implemented, although no referendum can be held about p2, is new to the literature and
suggests a more pervasive effect of referenda as well as the need for additional empirical
analysis.
5.2 The effect of additional information
The introduction of the popular referendum also changes how the behavior of the Incumbent
relates to the information available to the Voter. In fact, whereas in the baseline model, the
control the Voter exerts over policy-making may decrease—rather than increase—when the
Voter is more likely to observe the states of the world, this relationship is reversed for a large
range of the parameter space when the Voter is given the power to call for a referendum.
Indeed, in the baseline model, the level of control which the Voter is able to exert over
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policy dimension p2 depends on the probability that the Voter will learn the state of the
world on dimension p1. There, non-congruent Incumbents always disregard the Voter’s true
preferences on policy dimension p2 by implementing p2 6= ω2 when the probability of feedback
q1 is high, but choose p2 = ω2 with positive probability when q1 is low. Hence, the Voter may
be able to exert more control over policy p2, when the probability of feedback on dimension
p1 is lower rather than higher. This holds true although an increase in the probability
of feedback q1 does not increase the probability that the Incumbent implements p1 = ω1.
Indeed, in the absence of the referendum, the non-congruent Incumbent chooses p1 6= ω1
for all q1 ∈ [0, 1] . Moreover, it is interesting to note that this negative spillover effect of
information occurs even though the two policy dimensions are entirely independent.
Once the popular referendum is introduced, the ability of the electorate to control the
behavior of elected officials increases with the probability of feedback, for a large range of
the parameter space. If the value of holding office is sufficiently high, B ≥ B, non-congruent
Incumbents choose the policy that hurts the Voter on dimension p1, when q1 is low, but
always match the policy to the state of the world, p1 = ω1, when q1 is high.
Note, however, that when the value of holding office is low, B < B, and uncertainty
about policy p1 may not resolve, a higher probability of feedback may reduce the control that
the Voter exerts over elected officials. In this range of the parameter space, the relationship
between the probability that a non-congruent Incumbent chooses p2 = ω2 and the probability
of feedback q1 is non-monotonic. More precisely, a non-congruent Incumbent sets p2 = ω2
if q1 <
2B
B+1
or if q1 > 1 − 2B, but chooses p2 6= ω2 with positive probability when q1 ∈[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B]. Similarly, the relationship between the probability that a non-congruent
Incumbent sets p1 = ω1 and q1 is ambiguous. Remember that when B < B and q1 ∈[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B], there exists an infinity of equilibria. In any of these equilibria, non-congruent
Incumbents choose p1 = ω1 with positive probability. Depending on the specific equilibrium
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that the Incumbents coordinate on, the probability with which p1 = ω1 may go up or go
down compared to the case where q1 is low.
Proposition 4. Assume B ≥ B. Whereas in the baseline model the control the Voter exerts
over policy p2 is weakly decreasing in the probability of feedback q1, once direct democracy is
introduced the control the Voter exerts over policies p1 and p2 is increasing in q1.
Allowing citizen-initiated referenda has a similar impact on the relationship between
α, the probability that the state of the world ω1 is equal to 1, and the probability that the
non-congruent Incumbent implements p2 = ω2. In fact, in the baseline model when q1 is
low (q1 <
B
B+1
) the probability with which the non-congruent Incumbent chooses p2 = ω2
in equilibrium decreases in α. In this setting, α can represent how certain the Voter is that
p1 = 1 is the optimal policy, when ω1 is not revealed to her. Hence, as the uncertainty about
the optimal policy p1 increases, i.e. as α decreases, the Voter improves his control over policy
p2. The logic behind this result is as follows. In equilibrium, the non-congruent Incumbent
chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) upon observing ω1 = −1 and mixes between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and
(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) upon observing ω1 = 1. For the non-congruent Incumbent to be willing
to choose (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2), it must be the case that the Voter reelects the Incumbent
with positive probability upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). This, in turn, means that
the Voter must believe that the Incumbent is at least as likely to be congruent as a random
replacement. As α increases, the congruent Incumbent becomes less likely to choose p1 = −1,
and thus the Voter is more inclined to believe that the Incumbent is non-congruent upon
observing p1 = −1. Thus to maintain the Voter’s willingness to reelect upon observing
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2), the non-congruent Incumbent needs to choose (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with
lower probability.
Again, introducing popular referenda reverses this relationship for a large range of the
parameter space. Indeed, when q1 < min{ 2BB+1 , 1B+2} the non-congruent Incumbent chooses
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(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) with probability 2− 1α , whenever he observes ω1 = 1. In other words, the
probability that the non-congruent Incumbent chooses p2 = ω2 increases in α. Hence, as the
Voter becomes more confident that ω1 = 1 is indeed the right policy, i.e. as α increases, so
does the control the Voter exerts over policy p2.
5.3 Reelection strategy
In the baseline model, as well as in the direct democracy game, the reelection strategy used
by the Voter has aspects of a retrospective rule. The Voter always dismisses the Incumbent
when it is revealed that he did not match the policy to the state of the world. Similarly, when
the Voter does not observe the state of the world on dimension 1, she is more likely to reelect
the Incumbent when he chooses the popular policy p1 = 1. Moreover, the model is consistent
with empirical findings by Hugh-Jones (2010) and Bali and Davis (2007) which suggest that
incumbents are more likely to be reelected in states that permit the initiative. Indeed, as
non-congruent Incumbents are more likely to mimic the behavior of congruent ones when
the popular referendum is introduced, the Voter is often indifferent between reelecting and
dismissing the Incumbent. Hence, there always exist equilibria in which the Incumbent is
reelected more often under direct than under representative democracy.
The reelection strategy also presents more surprising aspects. In the baseline model,
when q1 is low and non-congruent Incumbents thus only partially separate from congruent
ones, the probability with which the Voter reelects the Incumbent is increasing in the prob-
ability of feedback q1 and decreasing in the value of holding office B. As the non-congruent
Incumbent mixes between (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) upon observing ω1 = 1,
he must be indifferent between these two policy vectors in equilibrium. As the probability
of feedback q1 increases, the type of the non-congruent Incumbent is more likely to be re-
31
vealed to the Voter which reduces the incentives of the non-congruent Incumbent to choose
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). On the contrary, an increase in the value of holding office strengthens
the incentives of a non-congruent Incumbent to choose (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Therefore, to
maintain indifference between (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2), the probabil-
ity with which the Voter reelects the Incumbent upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) must
increase when q1 increases and decrease when B increases.
The same relationship holds between the probability of reelection and the value of
holding office in the direct democracy game. The introduction of the popular referendum
alters the relationship between the probability of reelection and the probability of feedback,
however. In fact, when q1 is low, the probability that the Voter reelects the Incumbent
upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) is decreasing in q1, while it is weakly increasing upon
observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). When q1 is low, the non-congruent Incumbent mixes between
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) upon observing ω1 = 1. As the Voter always
reelects upon observing p1 = ω1, the incentives for the non-congruent Incumbent to choose
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) increase when q1 increases. Hence, to maintain indifference, the Voter must
reelect the Incumbent less often upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
5.4 The Frequency of Referenda
I now discuss some of the predictions generated by the model as they relate to the frequency
of referenda. The first lesson is that for wide swaths of the model’s parameter space, the
Voter does not hold a referendum in equilibrium. Indeed, when q1 ≥ max{1 − 2B, 1B+2}
all the types of the Incumbent implement p1 = ω1 in equilibrium. Therefore, the Voter
never has an incentive to correct the decision of the elected representative when q1 is high.
For the remaining range of the parameter space, non-congruent Incumbents enact p1 6= ω1
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with positive probability and the Voter holds a referendum in equilibrium whenever it is
revealed to her that the Incumbent chose the wrong policy on dimension p1. Note, however,
that there is a striking difference between the Voter’s behavior when q1 is low and when
q1 is intermediate. When q1 is low, the Voter only holds a referendum in equilibrium upon
observing p1 6= ω1. When q1 takes on intermediate values, however, the Voter calls for a
referendum with positive probability upon observing p2 6= ω2, even when the state of the
world ω1 is not revealed to her. Note that in this case the Voter, however, never calls for
a referendum when she observes p2 = ω2 and she remains uncertain about the state of the
world ω1.
Proposition 5. 1) If the probability of feedback q1 is high, i.e. q1 ≥ max{1− 2B, 1B+2},
then the Voter does not hold a referendum in equilibrium.
2) If the probability of feedback q1 is low, i.e. q1 < min{ 2BB+1 , 1B+2}, then the Voter holds
a referendum in equilibrium if, and only if, the Voter observes p1 6= ω1.
3) If the probability of feedback q1 takes intermediate values, i.e. q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B], then
the Voter holds a referendum in equilibrium with certainty when she observes p1 6= ω1
and with positive probability when she observes p2 6= ω2.
This behavior of the Voter presents several interesting features. First of all, as in Mat-
susaka and McCarty (2001) and Hug (2004), for a referendum to occur in equilibrium, the
Incumbent needs to be uncertain about the true preferences of the Voter on the policy di-
mension on which a referendum may be placed. Secondly, the Voter only holds a referendum
when it is revealed to her that the Incumbent is non-congruent, being because she observes
p1 6= ω1 or p2 6= ω2. This has the implication that the Voter never re-elects the Incumbent
when she holds a referendum in equilibrium. Holding a referendum is thus effectively akin to
recalling the Incumbent. Thirdly, when the value of holding office is sufficiently high B > B,
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the relationship between the frequency of referenda and the probability that uncertainty
about ω1 resolves is non-monotonic. More precisely, the frequency of referenda is increasing
in q1 on
[
0, 1
B+2
]
before remaining constant at 0 on
[
1
B+2
, 1
]
. This stems from the fact that
the probability with which non-congruent Incumbents choose p1 6= ω1 in equilibrium does
not depend on the probability of feedback q1, when q1 <
1
B+2
. However, as q1 increases, the
Voter is more likely to learn that the Incumbent implemented p1 6= ω1 and thus to hold a
referendum.
Corollary 6. If B ≥ B, then the probability that the Voter holds a referendum increases in
the probability of feedback q1 on
[
0, 1
B+2
]
before remaining constant at 0 on
[
1
B+2
, 1
]
.
Most interestingly, for some parameter values, the decision of the Voter to hold a ref-
erendum about policy p1 depends on the observed policy decision on dimension p2. More
precisely, once the Incumbent is revealed as non-congruent to the Voter via his decision about
policy p2, the Voter is more likely to try to constrain his decision making on dimension p1
by using the referendum. There seems to be some empirical support for this prediction as
Matsusaka (1992) finds that citizen initiatives play a more important role in periods when
elected representatives appear to be corrupt. This result is also interesting in so far as one
objection formulated against referenda is that the people sometimes vote against certain
policies simply to punish the government without consideration as to whether the policy is
sensible or not. Whether this is indeed correct or not is a contentious empirical question
(see for example in the context of referenda on European integration Hobolt (2009)). An
implication of this model, however, is that, even if it is correct, this fact does not necessarily
imply that the institution of the referendum does not improve decision-making, as such a
behavior may force elected officials to attend more closely to voters’ wishes on other policy
dimensions.
Moreover, when B < B, the Voter sometimes holds a referendum to set p1 = −1
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although ω1 is not revealed to her. Hence, as in Besley and Coate (2008), the fact that a
referendum does not conform with the ex ante majority opinion of the electorate does not
imply that the institution of the referendum does not improve congruence.
5.5 Voter Welfare
I now consider the effect of the popular referendum on ex ante Voter welfare. In the present
setup, as shown above, the popular referendum improves the congruence between enacted
policies and the Voter’s true preferences in the first period. In this sense, direct democracy
increases the first-period welfare of the Voter. Note, however, that this improved congruence
results from the decision of non-congruent Incumbents to mimic the behavior of congruent
Incumbents more often under direct democracy than in a purely representative environment.
Therefore, the popular referendum decreases the ability of the Voter to select good types at
the election booth and thus reduces the second-period welfare of the Voter. The introduction
of the popular referendum thus represents a trade-off for the Voter. Given the heuristic nature
of the second period I remain agnostic as to the relative importance of these two effects.
6 Semi-congruent Types
In the model, an incumbent is either congruent or non-congruent. Note, however, that
in principle an incumbent may be congruent with respect to some policy dimensions and
not others. In this section, I provide an argument for why including semi-congruent types
does not alter fundamentally the logic of the model. Assume that pi now represents the
probability that the incumbent is congruent with respect to policy dimension pi. In such a
setting, the incumbent is congruent with respect to both first period policies with probability
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pi2, congruent with respect to policy p1 but not congruent with respect to policy p2 with
probability pi(1 − pi) and so forth. Assume further that the elected official has to choose
two policies in the second period as well, i.e. p3 and p4 and that the policy preferences over
p1 and p3 (respectively p2 and p4) are identical. In such a case, a congruent type matches
both second-period policies to their respective states of the world, a semi-congruent type
only matches one of the two policies to the state of the world, while a non-congruent type
does not match any of the second period policies to the respective states of the world. The
expected utility to the Voter of electing a challenger is thus 2pi. The utility that the Voter
receives in the second period when electing an incumbent which has been revealed to be
semi-congruent or non-congruent, but not congruent, is at most 1. As pi > 1/2, we have the
following:
Proposition 7. If the Voter observes a first-period policy vector which is never chosen by a
congruent Incumbent in equilibrium, she does not reelect.
An implication of this proposition is that a non-congruent Incumbent, in order to get
re-elected, needs to enact a first-period policy vector that is also enacted by a congruent
type, even when semi-congruent types exist. In particular, this implies that a non-congruent
Incumbent needs to choose p2 = ω2 in order to get reelected. Similarly, when the probability
of feedback q1 is sufficiently high the non-congruent Incumbent essentially needs to choose
p1 = ω1 in order to get reelected with a substantial probability. Correspondingly, the in-
centives for non-congruent types to separate in the baseline model and to pool in the model
with the popular referendum remain similar.
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7 Strong office-holding motive, B ≥ 1
In this section I study what happens when the Incumbent values staying in office over
choosing his preferred first-period policies, i.e. B ≥ 1. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium
of the baseline model in this case. As before, the equilibrium depends on the probability of
feedback q1 and the value of holding office B.
Proposition 8. Assume the value of holding office is high (B ≥ 1). In equilibrium:
1. if the probability of feedback is high (q1 ≥ 1B+1), non-congruent incumbents choose the
same first-period policies as congruent ones (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2),
2. if the probability of feedback is low (q1 <
1
B+1
), non-congruent Incumbents choose
p1 = ω1 with non-degenerate probability and p2 = ω2 with certainty.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Behavior of non-congruent Incumbent in Baseline Model
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Proposition 9. 1. Increasing the value of holding office from B < 1 to B ≥ 1 has
a similar effect on the decision making of public officials as the introduction of the
popular referendum.
1. When B ≥ 1 and q1 ∈
(
1
B+2
, 1
B+1
)
, the introduction of the popular referendum strictly
improves congruence with respect to p1.
Interestingly, increasing the value of holding office has a similar effect as the introduction
of the popular referendum. First of all, the congruence with respect to policies p1 and p2
in the baseline model improves when B ≥ 1 compared to a situation in which B < 1.
Similarly, the control the Voter exerts over elected representatives increases with the level of
information available to the Voter when B ≥ 1. This is interesting in so far as it clarifies the
mechanism through which the introduction of the referendum affects the decision-making of
public officials. Indeed, by constraining the policy options of the Incumbent, the popular
referendum essentially increases the value of retaining office, if only in relative terms.
Remark also that the introduction of the popular referendum still improves congru-
ence even when Incumbents have a strong office holding motive. In particular, when q1 ∈[
1
B+2
, 1
B+1
]
, non-congruent Incumbents always choose p1 = ω1 once the the possibility of a
popular referendum exists, whereas they choose p1 = ω1 with non-degenerate probability in
the absence of direct democracy. This stems from the fact that the costs a non-congruent
Incumbent incurs when p1 6= ω1 is revealed to the Voter increase with the introduction of
direct democracy, as the Voter now holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1. As a result the Incum-
bent then not only loses re-election but also the policy benefit associated with p1 6= ω1. The
probability of feedback above which the non-congruent Incumbent prefers to play p1 = ω1
with certainty is thus lower under direct democracy than under representative democracy.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has examined how the possibility of voters calling for a referendum affects electoral
accountability. I have shown that the introduction of the popular referendum, by limiting
the policy benefits that a non-congruent official can receive from choosing his (as opposed
to the voters) preferred policies, increases the incentives of non-congruent public officials
to mimic the behavior of congruent ones. A main implication of this result is that non-
congruent elected officials are more likely to enact policies that are in the public interest
once the popular referendum is introduced. Unlike the previous literature I have shown that
this improved congruence between enacted policies and voters’ preferences also concerns
policy dimensions on which no referendum may be placed. In this sense, direct democracy
may have a much more pervasive effect on representative democracy than previously thought.
Moreover, I have shown that direct democracy improves congruence even when the electorate
is unlikely to be fully informed about its true interests. The lack of expertise of voters, which
opponents of direct democracy often present as a major concern, may thus be a less severe
problem than heretofore acknowledged. Furthermore, under direct democracy the value to
the electorate of being informed may be higher than under representative democracy. Indeed,
under a strictly representative democracy, there are negative spillover effects of information
in the sense that voters being more likely to become informed about some policy dimensions
may lead non-congruent officials to disregard the preferences of the electorate more often
on other policy dimensions. In contrast, there are conditions under which the possibility
of popular referenda implies that being more informed improves voter control over public
officials, including on policy dimensions on which no referendum may be placed.
The analysis suggests that empirical research on the impact of direct democracy on
congruence has to some extent been looking for the keys under the lamp post. Testing
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whether the popular referendum also improves congruence on policy dimensions on which
no referendum is placed represents an interesting agenda for future empirical research.
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9 Appendix
Let T be the type space of the Incumbent with T ≡ {C1,·, C−1,·, N1,·, N−1,·}. C1,· denotes the
type of the Incumbent which is congruent and observed ω1 = 1 and so forth. In principle we
would also have to distinguish types depending on what value of ω2 they observed. However,
as all the actors in the game observe ω2 and the game is identical for each value of ω2,
I suppress this information. Also let P be the set of policies that can be chosen by the
Incumbent in the first period for any pair of states of the world (ω1, ω2) with P ≡ {(p1 =
ω1, p2 = ω2), (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2), (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2), (p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2)}. Let p, p′ be arbitrary
elements in P . Moreover, denote η·,·(p) the probability that the non-congruent Incumbent
which observes (·, ·) plays the policy vector p ∈ P in the first period.
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Proposition A.1. The following pair of strategies and beliefs constitute the unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the baseline model that satisfies criterion D1:
1. If B < 1 and q1 ∈
[
B
B+1
, 1
]
, then congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)
for all ω, while non-congruent Incumbents choose (p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) for all ω. The
Voter reelects with certainty upon observing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2, ), (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), or
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and does not reelect otherwise. The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I =
c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and
µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = 0.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2), µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 =
ω2) ≤ pi.
2. If B < 1 and q1 ∈
[
0, B
B+1
]
, then congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for
all ω,
the non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = −1 chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2),
the non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = 1 chooses (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with
probability 1
α
− 1 and (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) with probability 2− 1α ,
the Voter reelects the Incumbent with certainty upon observing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) or
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), with probability
1
(1−q1)(B+1) upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2), and
does not reelect otherwise.
The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
αpi
αpi+(1−α)(1−pi) > pi, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+(1−α)(1−pi) = pi, µ(I = c|p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 0. Out-
of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1 = −1, p2 6= ω2), µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 6=
ω2), µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi.
3. If B ≥ 1 and q1 ∈
[
1
B+1
, 1
]
, then congruent and non-congruent Incumbents choose
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(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for all ω. The Voter may reelect with positive probability upon
observing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2), (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) or (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and does
not reelect otherwise. The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I =
c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy
µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2), µ(I = c|·, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi.
4. If B ≥ 1 and q1 ∈
[
0, 1
B+1
]
, then congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for
all ω;
the non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = −1 chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2);
the non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = 1 chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) with
probability 2− 1
α
and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with probability 1α − 1;
the Voter’s reelection strategy is: r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
1
(1−q1)(B+1) −
q1
1−q1 + r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≥ 1(1−q1)(B+1) , and
r∗(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) = r∗(·, p2 6= ω2) = 0.
The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi,
µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|·, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi.
The proof proceeds in four steps. In Lemma 1, I show that the pair of strategies and
beliefs identified in Proposition A.1 is indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In Lemma 2, I
then show that this equilibrium satisfies a straightforward adaptation of criterion D1 (Cho
and Kreps, 1987). Lemmas 3 and 4 then show that is is the unique equilibrium that satisfies
D1.
Lemma 1. The pair of strategies and beliefs identified in proposition A.1 constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
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Proof. 1. Assume B < 1 and q1 ≥ BB+1 . Then, the congruent Incumbent always gets
re-elected if he chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). Hence, UC(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 3 +B which
is the highest possible payoff that the congruent Incumbent can receive in the game
and thus the congruent Incumbent has no incentive to deviate. Moreover, UN(p1 6=
ω1, p2 6= ω2) = 2, while UN(p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 < 2, UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) =
1 + (1− q1)(B + 1) ≤ 2 as q1 ≥ BB+1 , and UN(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1 < 2 as B < 1.
Hence, the non-congruent Incumbent has no incentive to deviate. Moreover, µ(I =
c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 > pi,
µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = 0,
and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are specified by µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2), µ(I = c|p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2) ≤ pi. It follows that the Voter has no incentive to deviate.
2. Assume B < 1 and q1 <
B
B+1
. Then, C1,· receives a payoff of 3 + B when choosing
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and thus does not have an incentive to deviate. C−1,· receives a
payoff of 3+q1(B+1) when choosing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). Deviating to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
yields 1+(1−q1)(B+1) < 3, while deviating to p2 6= ω2 yields at most 1. Hence, C−1,·
has no incentive to deviate. Moreover, UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)(B + 1),
while UN−1,·(p2 6= ω2) ≤ 2 < 1 + (1− q1)(B + 1) as q1 < BB+1 , and UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) = B + 1 < 2. Hence, N−1,· has no incentive to deviate. N1,· receives a payoff
of 2 from choosing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) as well as from choosing (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2).
Deviating to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) yields B + 1 < 2, while deviating to (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2)
yields 1 < 2. Hence, N1,· has no incentive to deviate. The Voter’s beliefs are given
by: µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = αpiαpi+(1−α)(1−pi) > pi
as α > 1/2, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+α( 1
α
−1)(1−pi) = pi and µ(I = c|p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = 0. Out-
of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1 = −1, p2 6= ω2), µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 6=
ω2), µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi. It follows that the Voter has no incentive to deviate
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from his reelection strategy.
3. Assume B ≥ 1 and q1 ∈
[
1
B+1
, 1
]
and that the choice of first-period policy vectors is
as specified in proposition 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p) ≤ pi
for all p. Based on these beliefs the re-election strategy used by the Voter is indeed a
best-response. In order for the non-congruent Incumbent not to deviate, the re-election
probabilities used by the Voter need to satisfy the following inequalities:
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = q1r
∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥

1 + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
2
≥

UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
UN1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2)
and
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = q1r∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥

1 + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
2
≥

UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
UN−1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2).
Note that there always exists re-election probabilities r∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2), r∗(p1 =
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ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2), r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), and r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) such that these
inequalities are satisfied. Consider for example r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, and r∗(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) = r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). It is straightforward to show that for such
re-election probabilities the congruent Incumbent has no incentive to deviate either.
4. Assume B ≥ 1 and q1 ∈
[
0, 1
B+1
]
and that the choice of first-period policy vec-
tors is as specified in proposition 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
pi
pi+(2− 1
α
)(1−pi) > pi, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) =
αpi
αpi+[(1−α)+α(2− 1α )](1−pi)
= pi, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+α( 1
α
−1)(1−pi) = pi,
and µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p) ≤ pi
for all p. Based on these beliefs the re-election strategy used by the Voter is indeed a
best-response.
Hence, UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1)
and UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = q1 + (1 − q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)).
In equilibrium, N1,· is mixing between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
and hence is indifferent between these two policy vectors. Indifference is satisfied as
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1(1−q1)(B+1) −
q1
1−q1 + r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As q1 < 1B+1 , this
implies 1 ≥ r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Moreover, as r∗(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) ≥ 1(1−q1)(B+1) , we have UN1,·(p2 6= ω2) ≤ 2 ≤ q1 + (1 − q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2)(B + 1)) = UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Hence, N1,· has no incentive to deviate.
To see that N−1,· has no incentive to deviate note that, as r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) >
r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≥ 1(1−q1)(B+1) and as q1 < 1B+1 , we have UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = q1 + (1 − q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)) > 2 ≥ UN−1,·(p2 6= ω2) and
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > (1−q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B+1)+q1(B+1) = UN−1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2).
Moreover, we have UC−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(2 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B +
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1)) + q1(B + 3) > 1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UC−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
and UC1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(2 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)) + q1(B + 3) >
1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UC1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) as r∗(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) =
1
(1−q1)(B+1) −
q1
1−q1 + r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As deviating to p2 6= ω2 yields at most
a payoff of 1 < 2, congruent Incumbents have no incentive to deviate.
Lemma 2. The pair of strategies and beliefs identified in proposition A.1 satisfy criterion
D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
Proof. Note that for any policy vector of first period policies p ∈ P , there are two information
sets that could be reached: (p1, p2; ·, ω2) and (p1, p2;ω1, ω2). Note that for any retention
probability used at any information set there exists a specification of beliefs of the Voter
about the types of the Incumbent that makes this retention probability a best-response
of the Voter at that information set. Let r denote the vector of re-election probabilities
(r(p1, p2; ·, ω2), r(p1, p2;ω1, ω2)) used by the Voter. Now let D(t, T, p) be the set of vectors
of probabilities of retention r that make type t strictly prefer p to his equilibrium strategy
policy vector and let D0(t, T, p) be the set of vectors of retention probabilities that make
type t exactly indifferent. Finally, let D1(t, T, p) ≡ D(t, T, p) ∪ D0(t, T, p). Criterion D1
requires that if for some type t there exists a type t′ such that D1(t, T, p) ⊂ D(t′, T, p), then
the Voter should not believe that she is facing an Incumbent of type t when she observes p.
Note that in any equilibrium identified in proposition A.1, the equilibrium payoff of
any congruent type is strictly greater than the equilibrium payoff of any non-congruent
type. Now consider any policy vector p 6= (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and fix a vector of re-election
probabilities r. We have UN(p, r) ≥ UC(p, r). It follows that D1(C, T, p) ⊂ D(N, T, p) at
any out-of-equilibrium information set (p;ω). Therefore, D1 requires that the Voter believes
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she is facing a non-congruent type upon observing (p;ω) and thus should not re-elect at
these information sets. Note that so far we only have pinned down out-of-equilibrium beliefs
at information sets where the Voter observes both the policy vector of first-period policies
and the vector of first-period states of the world. To pin down beliefs at information sets
of the kind (p1, p2; ·, ω2), we use the re-election probabilities just specified for corresponding
information sets (p1, p2;ω1, ω2). Note that the only information sets to consider are of the
kind (p1, p2 6= ω2) and that based on the previous step we have r(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) = 0.
Hence, UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) = 2 + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2 6= ω2)(B + 1), while the payoff to a
congruent type of choosing the same policy vector (p1, p2 6= ω2) is at most 1+(1−q1)r(p1, p2 6=
ω2)(B + 1). Therefore, D1 requires that the Voter believes she is facing a non-congruent
type upon observing (p1, p2 6= ω2) at any such out-of-equilibrium information set.
Lemma 3. The pair of strategies and beliefs characterized in proposition A.1 constitute the
unique equilibrium in which congruent incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2).
Proof. 1. Assume B < 1 and that congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). As
UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) ≥ 2 > B + 1 ≥ UN(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2), the non-congruent Incum-
bent never chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) in equilibrium. Moreover, if the non-congruent
Incumbent chooses pi 6= ωi (i ∈ {1, 2}) with positive probability in equilibrium, the
Voter learns that the Incumbent is non-congruent upon observing pi 6= ωi and thus
does not reelect whenever ωi is revealed to her. It follows that there is no equi-
librium in which the non-congruent Incumbent chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) as then
UN(p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 < 2 ≤ UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2). Hence, in equilibrium the
non-congruent Incumbent chooses between (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 6= ω2, p2 6= ω2).
Moreover, we have UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1 + (1 − q1)(B + 1). Hence, if q1 > BB+1 ,
UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) < 2 and the non-congruent Incumbent chooses (p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2)
in equilibrium.
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As N1,· never chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and as α > 1/2 we have µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) =
αpi
αpi+η−1,·(p1=1,p2=ω2)(1−α)(1−pi) > pi for all η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) in any equilibrium.
It follows that UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)(B + 1). Hence, if q1 < BB+1 , we
have UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 2 and N−1,· chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) in equilibrium.
There is no equilibrium, however, in which N1,· chooses (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with
certainty. Assume otherwise, then µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+α(1−pi) < pi and
thus UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 < 2. Similarly, if q1 < BB+1 , there is no equilibrium
in which N1,· chooses (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) with certainty, as then µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) = 1 and thus UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)(B + 1) > 2. It follows
that if q1 <
B
B+1
then N1,· mixes between (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2)
in any equilibrium, which requires UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = 2 = UN1,·(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) and thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) =
1
(1−q1)(B+1) ∈ (0, 1). For the Voter to be willing to re-elect with positive probability,
we need µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+αη1,·(p1=−1,p2=ω2)(1−pi) = pi which implies
η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1α − 1.
2. Assume B ≥ 1 and that congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). I first show
that there then is no equilibrium in which non-congruent Incumbents choose (p1, p2 6=
ω2) with positive probability. WLOG assume N1,· plays (p1, p2 6= ω2) with positive
probability. Then, µ(I = c|p1, p2 6= ω2) = 0 and thus UN1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2) ≤ 2. Moreover,
µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi and r∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1. Finally,
µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi or µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi. If µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) > pi, then UN1·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = B+ 1 > 2 and N1,· deviates to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
If µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi, then η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1 in equilibrium.
Note that µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi implies µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi.
Thus, if q1 ≤ 1B+1 , UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)(B + 1) ≥ B + 1 > 2 and
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N1,· wants to deviate to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Moreover, UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) =
B + 1 > 2 ≥ UN−1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2). Hence, η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1 implies that
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) ≥ B + 1 which implies
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≥ B(1−q1)(B+1) . If q1 > 1B+1 , this is impossible, however, as then
B
(1−q1)(B+1) > 1. It follows that N1,· and N−1,· choose between (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and
(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2).
Note moreover, that there is no equilibrium in which µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < pi.
Assume otherwise. Then it must be the case that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and η−1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) are superior to 0. But then, UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 < 2 = UN−1,·(p1 =
1, p2 6= ω2) which contradicts η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 0. By a similar argument, there
is no equilibrium in which µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < pi. This implies that in any
equilibrium η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1α−1 as otherwise µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < pi.
The fact that in equilibrium µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
are superior or equal to pi implies that N1,· chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) deterministically
if, and only if N−1,· does so as well.
I now show that if q1 >
1
B+1
, then N chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) deterministically.
To derive a contradiction assume that N1,· is mixing between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Then, UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = q1(B + 1) + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2)(B + 1) = 1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As
q1 >
1
B+1
we have r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). But then N−1,· chooses
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) deterministically, which by the argument made in the previous
paragraph implies that N1,· chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically as well. To see
this, assume otherwise. Then UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = q1(B + 1) + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) > 1 + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
and N−1,· wants to deviate to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
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Next I show that if q1 <
1
B+1
, then N1,· playing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) with positive prob-
ability implies that N−1,· chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically. By arguments
made above, it is the case in any equilibrium that N1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) with
positive probability. This requires that UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = q1r
∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 =
ω2)(B+1)+(1−q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B+1) ≥ 1+(1−q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B+1) =
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As q1 < 1B+1 , q1(B + 1) < 1 and thus r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) >
r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). But then UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2)(B+1) > q1(B+1)+(1−q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B+1) = UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
and N−1,· chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically. This in turn implies that
η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 2 − 1α as otherwise µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < pi. From
η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 2− 1α , η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1α − 1, and η1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2) = 0,
we conclude that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 2 − 1α , and η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1α − 1 in
equilibrium.
Lemma 4. The pair of strategies and beliefs characterized in proposition A.1 constitute the
unique equilibrium that satisfies criterion D1.
Proof. Assume there exists an equilibrium in which (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) is not played with
positive probability for some state of the world ω. Fix a vector of re-election probabilities
r, then UC(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2, r) > UN(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2, r). Moreover, for any policy vector
p 6= (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and any vector of equilibrium re-election probabilities r∗ we have
UC(p, r
∗) ≤ UN(p, r∗). In other words, in any equilibrium in which (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) is
not played with positive probability the equilibrium payoff of any non-congruent type is at
least as high as the equilibrium payoff of any congruent type. It follows that D1(N, T, p1 =
ω1, p2 = ω2) ⊂ D(C, T, p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and the Voter should believe she is facing a
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congruent Incumbent upon observing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). Similarly, D
1(N1,·, T, p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) ⊂ D1(N−1,·, T, p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ⊂ D(C1,·, T, p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and the Voter should
believe she is facing a congruent Incumbent upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). A similar
argument holds for (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). But then the congruent Incumbent wants to deviate
to (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) as he then receives a payoff of 3 + B which is greater then 2 + B,
the highest payoff the congruent type can get in any equilibrium in which he does not play
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2).
Proposition A.2. The following pair of strategies and beliefs constitute the equilibrium of
the direct democracy model when q1 ∈ [0, 1] and q2 = 1.
1. If q1 ∈
[
max{1− 2B, 1
B+2
}, 1], then congruent and non-congruent Incumbents choose
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) for all ω, the Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1 if p1 6= ω1 is
revealed to her, may reelect with positive probability upon observing (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2),
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and does not reelect otherwise. The Voter’s
beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I =
c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2),
µ(I = c|·, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi. If q1 ∈ [1− 2B, 1−B], the Voter also holds, with probability
R1 ∈
[
1− B
1−q1 ,
B
1−q1
]
, a referendum to set p1 = 1 upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2)
and with probability R−1 ∈
[
1− B
1−q1 ,
B
1−q1
]
a referendum to set p1 = −1 upon observing
(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2).
2. If q1 ∈
[
0,min{ 2B
B+1
, 1
B+2
}], then congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2),
The non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = −1 chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2);
The non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω1 = 1 chooses (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) with
probability 2− 1
α
and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with probability 1α − 1;
The Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1 if p1 6= ω1 is revealed to her and to set
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p1 = 1 upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2);
The Voter’s reelection strategy is: r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
1
B+1
− q1
1−q1 +r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≥ 1(1−q1)(B+1) and r∗(p1 6= ω1, p2) = r∗(p1, p2 6= ω2) =
0.
The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi,
µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|·, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi.
3. If q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B], there exists an infinity of equilibria. In all these equilibria,
congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and the non-congruent Incumbents
play p1 = ω1 and p2 6= ω2 with positive probability. For all q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B] there
always exists equilibria in which the non-congruent Incumbents choose p2 = ω2 with
positive probability. If q1 ∈
[
2B+1
2B+3
, 1− 2B] however, there also exist equilibria in which
the non-congruent Incumbents play p2 6= ω2 with certainty.
The Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1 when p1 6= ω1. If ω1 is not revealed,
the Voter never holds a referendum when p2 = ω2, and holds a referendum with non-
degenerate probability whenever p2 6= ω2.
The Voter always reelects with positive probability when p2 = ω2 and never reelects
when p2 6= ω2.
The proof proceeds in the following steps. First, I show in Lemma 5 that the pair of
strategies and beliefs identified in proposition A.2 constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In Lemma 6, I then show that this equilibrium survives D1. Lemmas 7 to 13 prove that
if q1 ∈
[
0,min{ 2B
B+1
, 1
B+2
}] this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in which congruent
Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). Lemmas 7, 14, 15 then prove the same statement
for q1 > max{1 − 2B, 1B+2}. Lemmas 16 and 17 then prove that when q1 ∈
[
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B] ,
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then in any equilibrium in which congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2), the non-
congruent Incumbents play p1 = ω1 and p2 6= ω2 with positive probability. Finally, Lemma 18
shows that an equilibrium satisfies D1 if, and only if, congruent Incumbents choose p2 = ω2
in equilibrium.
Lemma 5. The pair of strategies and beliefs identified in proposition A.2 constitutes a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. 1. Assume that q1 ∈
[
max{1− 2B, 1
B+2
}, 1] and that the profile of first-period
policy vectors is as specified in proposition 2. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) =
µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi. Out-of-equilibrium
beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2), µ(I = c|·, p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi. Based on these
beliefs the re-election strategy used by the Voter is indeed a best-response. In order
for the non-congruent Incumbent not to deviate, the re-election probabilities used by
the Voter need to satisfy the following inequalities:
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = q1r
∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥

(1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
2− q1
≥

UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
UN1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2),
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and
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = q1r∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥

(1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
2− q1
≥

UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
UN−1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2).
Note that, if q1 ≥ max{1−B, 1B+2} there always exists re-election probabilities r∗(p1 =
ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2), r
∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2), r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), and r∗(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) such that these inequalities are satisfied. In any case r
∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = r∗(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) = r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 satisfies the conditions. It is straightforward to
show that for such re-election probabilities congruent Incumbents have no incentive to
deviate either. If q1 ∈
[
max{1− 2B, 1
B+2
}, 1−B) then B+ 1 < 2− q1, however. If the
Voter holds, with probability R−1 ∈
[
1− B
1−q1 ,
B
1−q1
]
, a referendum to set p1 = −1 upon
observing (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2), then we have B+ 1 ≥ 1 + (1− q1)R−1 = UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6=
ω2) and B+1 ≥ 1+(1−q1)(1−R−1) = UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2). Thus, there then always
exists re-election probabilities r∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2), r∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2),
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), and r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) such that non-congruent Incumbents
have no incentive to deviate to (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2). A similar remark holds with respect
to (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2).
2. Assume that q1 ∈
[
0,min{ 2B
B+1
, 1
B+2
}] and that the choice of first-period policy vec-
tors is as specified in proposition 2. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
pi
pi+(2− 1
α
)(1−pi) > pi, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
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αpi
αpi+[(1−α)+α(2− 1α )](1−pi)
= pi, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−α)pi(1−α)pi+α( 1
α
−1)(1−pi) = pi, and
µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p2 6= ω2) ≤ pi.
Based on these beliefs the re-election strategy used by the Voter is indeed a best-
response.
By lemma 7 below, the Voter never holds a referendum upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2). Moreover, we have Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi(1−α)pi(1−α)+( 1
α
−1)(1−pi)α = pi > 1/2
and the Voter does not hold a referendum upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Hence, UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1) and
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1−q1)(1+r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B+1)). In equilibrium, N1,·
is mixing between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and hence is indifferent
between these two policy vectors. Indifference is satisfied as r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
1
B+1
− q1
1−q1 + r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As q1 < 1B+2 , this implies 1 ≥ r∗(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) > r
∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Moreover, as the Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = 1
whenever needed upon observing p2 6= ω2 and as r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≥ 1(1−q1)(B+1) , we
have UN1,·(p2 6= ω2) = 1 ≤ (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1) = UN1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2). Hence, N1,· has no incentive to deviate.
To see that N−1,· has no incentive to deviate, note that UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1−
q1)(1 + r
∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B+ 1)) ≥ 2− q1 = UN−1,·(p2 6= ω2) as r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≥
1
(1−q1)(B+1) . Moreover, as r
∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and q1 < 1B+2 ,
we have UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1) =
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Moreover, we have UC1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)(2 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)) +
q1(B + 3) > 1 + q1 + (1 − q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UC1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2),
and UC−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)(2+ r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B+1))+ q1(B+3) >
1 + q1 + (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) = UC−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). As deviating to
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p2 6= ω2 yields at most a payoff of 1 < 2, congruent Incumbents have no incentive to
deviate.
3. A full statement and proof of the equilibria in that range is available upon request.
In lemmas 16 and 17 below, I show, however, that there is neither an equilibrium in
which non-congruent Incumbents never choose p2 6= ω2 nor an equilibrium in which
they never choose p1 = ω1 in that range.
Lemma 6. The perfect Bayesian equilibria identified in proposition A.2 survive criterion
D1.
Proof. Note that in any equilibrium identified in proposition A.2, the equilibrium payoff of
any congruent type is strictly greater than the equilibrium payoff of any non-congruent type.
Now remark that UC(p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2), UC(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) ≤ 1 + q1r(p1, p2;ω1, ω2)(B +
1) + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2; ·, ω2)(B + 1), while UN(p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2), UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 6= ω2) ≥
1 + q1r(p1, p2;ω1, ω2)(B + 1) + (1− q1)r(p1, p2; ·, ω2)(B + 1). It follows that the Voter should
believe she is facing a non-congruent Incumbent upon observing (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) or (p1 6=
ω1, p2 6= ω2). A similar argument shows that the Voter should believe she is facing a non-
congruent Incumbent upon observing (p1, p2 6= ω2). Next suppose (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) is out-
of-equilibrium. As UC(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 2+q1r(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2)(B+1)+(1−q1)r(p1, p2 =
ω2)(B+1) while UC(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 2+q1r(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B+1)+(1−q1)r(p1, p2 =
ω2)(B + 1), it must be the case that q1r(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2 =
ω2)(B + 1) ≥ q1r(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) for C to be
willing to deviate to (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2). Moreover, UN(p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2) ≥ q1r(p1 6=
ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) while UN(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = q1r(p1 =
ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + (1 − q1)r(p1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1). It follows that if q1r(p1 6= ω1, p2 =
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ω2)(B+ 1) + (1− q1)r(p1, p2 = ω2)(B+ 1) = q1r(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B+ 1) + (1− q1)r(p1, p2 =
ω2)(B + 1) N is willing to deviate to (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2). Hence, if in equilibrium N chooses
(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2), the Voter should believe she is facing a non-congruent Incumbent upon
observing (p1 6= ω1, p2 = ω2).
Lemmas 7 to 13 prove that if q1 ∈
[
0,min{ 2B
B+1
, 1
B+2
}] the pair of strategies and be-
liefs characterized in proposition A.2 constitute the unique equilibrium in which congruent
Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2). Hence, in the following, I assume throughout that
congruent Incumbents play (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 7. If the congruent Incumbent chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2), then the Voter never
holds a referendum upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
Proof. Pr(ω1 = 1|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (pi+η1,·(p1=1,p2=ω2)(1−pi))α(pi+η1,·(p1=1,p2=ω2)(1−pi))α+η−1,·(p1=1,p2=ω2)(1−pi)(1−α) which
is increasing in η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and decreasing in η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). Let η1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) = 0 and η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1. Then, Pr(ω1 = 1|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
piα
piα+(1−pi)(1−α) > α as pi > 1/2.
Lemma 8. There does not exist an equilibrium in which N1,· chooses (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
with certainty.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then
µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1− α)pi
(1− α)pi + (α + (1− α)η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)) (1− pi) < pi
for all η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then UN1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1− q1 < 1 ≤ UN1,·(p2 6= ω2).
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Lemma 9. If q1 <
2B
B+1
, there does not exist an equilibrium in which N1,· does not play
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = 0. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi
for all η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), which implies that UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1 and
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)(B+ 2). By the previous lemma, there is no equilibrium in
which N1,· chooses (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) with certainty. Hence, if η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0 in
equilibrium then N1,· must be playing p2 6= ω2 with positive probability. N1,· is only willing
to choose (p1, p2 6= ω2) with positive probability if N−1,· does so as well, as otherwise the
Voter infers that ω1 = 1 when observing (p1, p2 6= ω2) and sets p1 = 1 via referendum if
needed. But then, UN1·(p1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 < B + 1 = UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). So suppose
N1,· and N−1· play (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) with positive probability. For such a behavior to be a
best-response, it has to be the case that
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)(1−R−1) ≥ (1− q1)(B + 2), and
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)R−1 ≥ B + 1,
as otherwise N−1,· deviates to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and N1,· deviates to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
respectively. This implies that B
1−q1 ≤ R−1 ≤ 11−q1−B−1. But this is impossible as q1 < 2BB+1
implies B
1−q1 >
1
1−q1 −B− 1. A similar argument shows that there is no equilibrium in which
N1,· and N−1,· choose (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) with positive probability when q1 < 2BB+1 .
Lemma 10. If q1 <
1
B+2
, then there does not exist an equilibrium in which N1,· plays
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≤ pi and as by lemma 7 the Voter does not
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hold a referendum upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), we have UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) =
(1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1). As q1 < 1B+2 , q1r∗(p1 =
ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) < 1 and thus UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) ≥ UN1,·(p2 6= ω2) ≥ 1 implies that
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 0 in equilibrium. This requires µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = pi and thus
η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Moreover, η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 implies µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) ≥ pi and Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 which in turn implies that the Voter does
not hold a referendum upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). If η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1
in equilibrium, then µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1. Hence,
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(B + 2) > B + 1 ≥ UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) as q1 < 1B+2 .
Hence, if η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 in equilibrium we have η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 which
requires that
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ q1r
∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥ (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
= UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
and
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
+ q1r
∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)
≥ (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
= UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
As q1 <
1
B+2
and thus q1r(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) < 1 − q1, (1) implies that r∗(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), whereas (2) implies r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < r∗(p1 =
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1, p2 = ω2). Contradiction.
Lemma 11. If q1 <
1
B+2
, then there does not exist an equilibrium in which N1,· mixes between
(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1, p2 6= ω2) and does not play (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) > 0, η1,·(p1, p2 6= ω2) > 0 and η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Case 1: η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = 0. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = αpiαpi+η1,·(p1=1,p2=ω2)α(1−pi) > pi as η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) < 1. Thus, r
∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(B + 2). As
η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0, we have Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and thus the Voter
does not hold a referendum upon observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Hence, UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) ≤ B + 1. As q1 < 1B+2 , we then have UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
and thus η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. This implies that µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1. But
then, UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(B + 2) > B + 1 ≥ UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and N1,·
deviates to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Case 2: η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 0. Then µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi as η1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) = 0 and thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1. But then UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) =
(1 − q1)(B + 2) which, as q1 < 1B+2 , is strictly greater than B + 1 ≥ UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
Thus, N1,· deviates to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 12. If q1 < min{ 2BB+1 , 1B+2} and N1,· mixes between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) in equilibrium, then N−1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) > 0, η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > 0, yet η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1. Case 1: µ(I = c|p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) < pi and thus r
∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Then, UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1− q1 < 1
and thus η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. As η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1, we have µ(I = c|p1 =
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1, p2 = ω2) > pi, contradicting the premise.
Case 2: µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = pi which implies that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1−( 1α−
1)η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). As η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1 we have η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 2− 1α
and η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1α − 1. In turn, η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1α − 1 implies
Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and thus the Voter does not hold a referendum upon
observing (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Hence, as N1,· is mixing, we have
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1)
= (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1)) = UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
As q1 <
1
B+2
, q1(B + 1) < 1− q1 and thus N1,· mixing implies r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2). But then,
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
> (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1)
= UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
and thus η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. As η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1α − 1, this implies
that µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 which contradicts
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Case 3: µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi. Then, r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and as
q1 <
1
B+2
, N−1,· never plays (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). As η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1, this
implies that N−1,· plays p2 6= ω2 with positive probability. In equilibrium, this requires
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1 − q1)R1 ≥ (1 − q1)(B + 2) = UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) or
UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)(1−R−1) ≥ (1− q1)(B + 2) = UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2),
which implies R1 ≥ B+2− 11−q1 or R−1 ≤ 11−q1−B−1. In turn, as N1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
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with positive probability, it must be the case that
B + 1 ≥ 1 + (1− q1)R−1
B + 1 ≥ 1 + (1− q1)(1−R1)
which implies that R−1 ≤ B1−q1 < 1 and R1 ≥ 1 − B1−q1 > 0. For the Voter to be willing to
adopt such probabilities of holding a referendum, it must be the case that N1,· plays p2 6= ω2
with positive probability. As N1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2), this requires R−1 = B1−q1 and
R1 = 1− B1−q1 . As q1 < 2BB+1 , we have 1− B1−q1 < B + 2− 11−q1 and B1−q1 > 11−q1 −B − 1. But
then, N−1,· wants to deviate to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 13. In any equilibrium in which N1,· mixes between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) and N−1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically, we have η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = 2− 1α and η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1α − 1.
Proof. Assume there exists an equilibrium in which N1,· mixes between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) and N−1,· plays (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) deterministically and assume
that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 2 − 1α . Then, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < pi and thus
r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Moreover, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi (and thus r∗(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) = 1) and Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = pi(1−α)pi(1−α)+η1,·(p1=−1,p2=ω2)(1−pi)α > pi as
η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1α−1. Hence, UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = q1(B+1) < (1−q1)(B+2) =
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) as q1 < 1B+2 . But then N1,· wants to deviate to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
So assume that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 2 − 1α . Then, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi
and thus r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1, which implies that UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1. If
η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1α−1, then as η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 2− 1α , we have η1,·(p2 6= ω2) > 0.
As N−1,· never plays p2 6= ω2, the Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = 1 if needed upon
observing p2 6= ω2. But then, UN1,·(p2 6= ω2) = 1 < B+1 which implies that η1,·(p2 6= ω2) = 0.
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So assume that η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > 1α − 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < pi and
thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1− q1 < B + 1 and N1,·
deviates to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
The following two lemmas together with lemma 7 prove that if q1 > max{1− 2B, 1B+2}
the pair of strategies and beliefs characterized in proposition A.2 constitute the unique
equilibrium in which congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 14. If q1 > max{1−2B, 1B+2}, there does not exist an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) < 1.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium in which η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) < 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi and thus r∗(p1 = ω1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1.
Case 1: η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 1− ( 1α − 1)η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). Then, µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) < pi and r
∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 − q1 < 1 ≤
UN−1,·(p2 6= ω2) and thus η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then, η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > 1,
which is impossible.
Case 2: η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1 − ( 1α − 1)η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). Then, µ(I =
c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi and thus r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1. Hence, UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 =
ω2) = B + 1 > (1 − q1)(B + 2) ≥ UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) as q1 > 1B+2 and thus η1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) = 0. In turn, η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1 and η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0 implies
that η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) > 0 or η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) > 0 which requires UN1,·(p1 =
1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)R−1 ≥ B + 1 = UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) or UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) =
1+(1−q1)(1−R1) ≥ B+1 = UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). This, in turn implies thatR−1 ≥ B1−q1 > 0
or R1 ≤ 1− B1−q1 < 1. This however requires η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) > 0 or η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6=
ω2) > 0 respectively as otherwise the Voter infers from (p1, p2 6= ω2) that ω1 = 1 and thus
sets R−1 = 0 or R1 = 1. It follows that η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1 which implies that
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µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi. Thus, UN−1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1. Finally, η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) > 0 or η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) > 0
requires that UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)R1 ≥ B + 1 = UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)
or UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 + (1− q1)(1−R−1) ≥ B+ 1 = UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) which
implies R1 ≥ B1−q1 or R−1 ≤ 1− B1−q1 . Hence, in equilibrium, we need 1− B1−q1 ≥ B1−q1 which
is impossible as q1 > 1− 2B.
Case 3: η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 − ( 1α − 1)η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and thus η−1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) > 0 as η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) < 1. Moreover, η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 − ( 1α −
1)η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) implies that η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) ≤ 1α−1 and thus Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) ≥ pi. It follows that the Voter does not hold a referendum upon observing
(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2). Suppose first that η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1 − η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
Then, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi, and µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and thus
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1 > (1 − q1)(B + 2) ≥ UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) as q1 > 1B+2 .
But then, η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0, contradiction. So suppose that η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) =
1− η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) which implies η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > 0. It follows that N1,· mixes
between (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) and (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) which requires
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
= (1− q1)r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1)
= UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
As q1 >
1
B+2
, q1(B+1) > 1−q1 and thus we have r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2).
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But then,
UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1− q1)r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1) + q1(B + 1)
> (1− q1)(1 + r∗(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)(B + 1))
= UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2)
and thus η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. Contradiction.
Lemma 15. If q1 > max{1− 2B, 1B+2} and N1,· plays (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) deterministically,
then so does N−1,·.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 =
ω2) < 1. Then, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi and
thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 and r∗(p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1. But then, UN−1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1 > (1− q1)(B + 2) ≥ UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) as q1 > 1B+2 . Moreover, as
η1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 1, if η−1,·(p2 6= ω2) > 0, the Voter infers that ω1 = −1 from p2 6= ω2
and sets p1 = −1 via referendum whenever needed. Hence, UN−1,·(p2 6= ω2) = 1 < B+ 1 and
N−1,· wants to deviate to (p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 16. If q1 ∈
(
2B
B+1
, 1− 2B), there does not exist an equilibrium s.t. non-congruent
types never choose p2 6= ω2.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e. assume there exists an equilibrium s.t. non-congruent types
choose p2 = ω2 deterministically. Case 1: q1 ≥ 1B+2 . Then, the highest possible payoff that
non-congruent incumbents can achieve when choosing p2 = ω2 is B + 1. In order for non-
congruent types not to want to deviate to (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) we need B+1 ≥ 1+(1−q1)R−1 =
UN1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) and B + 1 ≥ 1 + (1 − q1)(1 − R−1) = UN−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2), which
implies that R−1 ≤ B1−q1 and R−1 ≥ 1− B1−q1 . But B1−q1 ≥ 1− B1−q1 implies q1 ≥ 1− 2B.
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Case 2: q1 ∈
(
2B
B+1
, 1
B+2
)
. Note first that if q1 <
1
B+2
, the maximal payoff that N1,· can
achieve, in an equilibrium where non-congruent incumbents never choose p2 6= ω2, is B + 1.
To see this, assume there exists an equilibrium such that UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > B + 1.
As non-congruent types never choose p2 6= ω2, we have η1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 which
implies that µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < pi and thus r∗(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then,
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = 1 − q1 < 1 ≤ UN1,·(p2 6= ω2). Contradiction. So assume there
exists an equilibrium such that non-congruent Incumbents never choose p2 6= ω2. As the
highest payoff that N1,· can achieve is B + 1 and the highest payoff that N−1,· can achieve
is (1− q1)(B + 2), in equilibrium, it has to be the case that B + 1 ≥ 1 + (1− q1)(1−R1) =
UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2) and (1 − q1)(B + 2) ≥ 1 + (1 − q1)R1 = UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2).
This implies that R1 ≥ 1− B1−q1 and R1 ≤ B+ 2− 11−q1 which is impossible as q1 > 2BB+1 .
Lemma 17. There does not exist an equilibrium such that N1,· (or N−1,·) chooses (p1 =
1, p2 6= ω2) (or (p1 = −1, p2 6= ω2)) yet N−1,· (N1,·) does not.
Proof. WLOG, assume there exists an equilibrium such that N1,· chooses (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2)
with positive probability yet N−1,· does not. Then, Pr(ω1 = 1|p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2) = 1 and
the Voter does not hold a referendum upon observing (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2). Hence, UN1,·(p1 =
1, p2 6= ω2) = 1. Moreover, as N1,· does not play p2 = ω2 deterministically, we have µ(I =
c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi or µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi. In the first case, UN1,·(p1 =
1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1 > 1 and N1,· wants to deviate from (p1 = 1, p2 6= ω2). In the second
case, we have η−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) < 1 and thus µ(I = c|p1 = ω1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi.
Hence, UN−1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = B + 1. If q1 > 1B+2 , then B + 1 > (1 − q1)(B + 2)
and thus η−1,·(p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) = 0. But then µ(I = c|p1 = 1, p2 = ω2) > pi and N1,·
deviates to (p1 = 1, p2 = ω2). Moreover, µ(I = c|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > pi implies η1,·(p1 =
−1, p2 = ω2) < 1α − 1 and thus Pr(ω1 = −1|p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) > 1/2. Hence, if q1 ≤ 1B+2 ,
then UN1,·(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2) = (1 − q1)(B + 2) ≥ B + 1 > 1. But then, N1,· deviates to
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(p1 = −1, p2 = ω2).
Lemma 18. The pair of strategies and beliefs characterized in proposition A.2 are the only
equilibria to satisfy criterion D1.
Proof. Assume there exists an equilibrium in which p2 = ω2 is not played with positive
probability for some ω2 ∈ {−1, 1}. Fix a vector of re-election probabilities r and probability
R that the Voter holds a referendum to change p1 when ω1 is not revealed to her, then
UC(p1 = ·, p2 = ω2, r, R) > UN(p1 = ·, p2 = ω2, r, R). Moreover, for any policy vector p
such that p2 6= ω2 and any vector of equilibrium re-election and referendum probabilities
(r∗, R∗) we have UC(p, r∗, R∗) ≤ UN(p, r∗, R∗). In other words, in any equilibrium in which
p2 = ω2 is not played with positive probability the equilibrium payoff of any non-congruent
type is at least as high as the equilibrium payoff of any congruent type. It follows that
D1(N, T, p1, p2 = ω2) ⊂ D(C, T, p1, p2 = ω2) and the Voter should believe she is facing a
congruent Incumbent upon observing p2 = ω2. But then, if q1 > 0 the congruent Incumbent
wants to deviate to p2 = ω2 as he then receives a payoff of at least 2+B+q1 which is greater
then 2 + B, the highest payoff the congruent type can get in any equilibrium in which he
does not play p2 = ω2. Hence, to satisfy D1 it must be the case that C chooses p2 = ω2 for
all ω2 in equilibrium.
9.1 Appendix B
In this section of the appendix, I show that the spillover effects identified, namely that the
popular referendum also improves congruence with respect to policy dimensions on which
no referendum may be placed, is robust to a specification of the model in which the Voter is
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uncertain about which policy is in the public interest on the second policy dimension. Hence,
I assume from now on, that the Voter observes the state of the world ω1 but only observes
the state of the world ω2 with probability q2 ∈ [0, 1]. Note that in the baseline model policy
dimensions p1 and p2 are essentially identical up to the probability of feedback. Thus, to
see what the equilibrium of the baseline model is in this new setting, all one needs to do is
to invert p1 and p2. In the model with direct democracy, the equilibrium depends on the
probability of feedback q2 and the value of holding office B (see Figure 3). That is we have
the following result:
Proposition A.3. The following pair of strategies and beliefs constitute the unique equilib-
rium of the direct democracy model:
1. If q2 ∈
[
1
B+1
, 1
]
, then congruent and non-congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 =
ω2) for all ω, the Voter holds a referendum if and only if p1 6= ω1 and reelects if and only
if p1 = ω1. The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|p1 = ω1) = pi, µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1) ≤ pi.
2. If q2 ∈
[
0, 1
B+1
]
, then congruent Incumbents choose (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2),
The non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω2 = −1 chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = 1);
The non-congruent Incumbent who observes ω2 = 1 chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 = −1) with
probability 1
α
− 1 and (p1 = ω1, p2 = 1) with probability 2− 1α ;
The Voter holds a referendum if and only if p1 6= ω1;
The Voter’s reelection strategy is: r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) = 1, r∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = 1) =
1−q2(B+1)
(1−q2)(B+1) + r
∗(p1 = ω1, p2 = −1) and r∗(p1 6= ω1) = 0.
The Voter’s beliefs satisfy µ(I = c|(p1 = ω1, p2 = 1)) = µ(I = c|(p1 = ω1, p2 = −1)) =
pi, µ(I = c|(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2 = 1)) > pi, µ(I = c|(p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2 = −1)) = 1, and
µ(I = c|p1 6= ω1) ≤ pi.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Behavior of non-congruent Incumbent in Direct Democracy Model,
q1 = 1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]
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The logic behind this result is as follows. As the Voter knows the state of the world
ω1, the Voter holds a referendum to set p1 = ω1 whenever the Incumbent chooses p1 6= ω1.
Hence, whether non-congruent Incumbents choose p1 6= ω1 or p1 = ω1, their policy payoff
with respect to p1 is equal to 0 in equilibrium. Choosing p1 6= ω1 then does not yield any
policy gains to the non-congruent Incumbent but costs him the reelection, as the Voter
then learns his true type. In equilibrium, it is therefore never a best-response for the non-
congruent Incumbent to play p1 6= ω1 who thus chooses between (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) and
(p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2).
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Choosing (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) over (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) has a gain and a cost: On the
one hand the non-congruent Incumbent receives a higher first-period policy payoff, on the
other he loses reelection whenever uncertainty about ω2 is resolved. Note that the magnitude
of the cost increases with the probability of feedback q2. As the policy gain is equal to 1
and the value of reelection is B + 1, the cost of losing the election exceeds the policy gain
when the probability of feedback q2 is high. In such a case, the non-congruent Incumbent is
better off mimicking the behavior of congruent Incumbents with respect to all first-period
policies. When the probability of feedback q2 is low, and the non-congruent Incumbent
chooses (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) with sufficiently low probability, the Voter is willing to reelect the
Incumbent with positive probability whenever ω2 is not revealed. In this case, the cost of
choosing (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) over (p1 = ω1, p2 = ω2) is low, and the non-congruent Incumbent
implements (p1 = ω1, p2 6= ω2) with positive probability.
The introduction of the popular referendum also improves congruence in this new set-
ting. In the baseline model, the behavior of non-congruent Incumbents with respect to p1
depends on the likelihood that the Voter learns the optimality of the policy decision p2. If
the feedback q2 is high (q2 >
B
B+1
), the non-congruent Incumbents never match the policy
to the state of the world on dimension 1, i.e. they always choose p1 6= ω1. When feedback
is low however (q2 ≤ BB+1), they implement p1 = ω1 with non-degenerate probability. Once
representative democracy is supplemented by direct democracy however, non-congruent In-
cumbents always choose p1 = ω1. Moreover, as the Voter never holds a referendum in
equilibrium, p1 = ω1 is now implemented with certainty.
The spillover effects identified also hold. In the baseline model, non-congruent Incum-
bents never choose p2 = ω2, and this independently of the value of q2. In the model with
direct democracy however, the non-congruent Incumbents always choose p2 = ω2 with pos-
itive probability and even with certainty, when the probability of feedback q2 is sufficiently
75
high (q2 ≥ 1B+1). Arguments in sections 5.2 to 5.5 also apply in this case.
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